Finish Trip in Hole

Draft – Work in Progress. Subject to Revision

12:00 - 15:00

4/20/10



Data

- **Finish RIH to 8367'**
- **Mud transfer to boat begins at 13:28**

Interpretation

- **The approach to transferring mud may have impaired pit monitoring over next 4 hours**

Displace Boost, Choke, and Kill Lines

bp

15:04 - 15:54

4/20/10



Data

- Displaced booster line w/ seawater
- Displaced choke line with seawater
- Displaced kill line with seawater
- 1200 psi trapped in kill line

Interpretation

- Close booster, choke, and kill line bottom valves after displacements

Pump Spacer

15:56 - 16:28

4/20/10



Data

- **Pump 454 bbls LCM spacer (16.0 ppg)**
  - Form-a-Set + Form-a-Squeeze combination
  - Viscous, solids-laden fluid
- **Kill line pressure holds at 1200 psi**

Interpretation

- **Any gas from the cement job should be to surface by this point**
  - **No abnormal gas shows seen**

Legend

Green = 14 ppg Mud
Pink = 16 ppg Spacer
Blue = 8.6 ppg Seawater

Pump Seawater

Draft 2325 psi P 1200 psi Subject to Revision

16:29 - 16:52

4/20/10



Data

- **Pump 352bbls seawater**
  - Not enough to get spacer above BOP
- 2325 psi static pressure after pumping
  - **Calculated U-tube is 1628 psi**

Interpretation

- Higher than expected static pressure may indicate large spacer-to-water interface
- Significant solids settling expected once pumps stop
- High gel strength with 100% spacer

Legend

Green = 14 ppg Mud
Pink = 16 ppg Spacer
Blue = 8.6 ppg Seawater

Shut Annular

16:53 - 16:55

4/20/10



Data

- **Shut annular**

Interpretation

Legend

Green = 14 ppg Mud
Pink = 16 ppg Spacer
Blue = 8.6 ppg Seawater

Bleed to 1220 psi

bp

16:55 - 16:57

4/20/10



Data

- **Bleed drill pipe pressure from 2325 psi to 1220 psi to equalize with kill line**

Interpretation

Legend

Green = 14 ppg Mud
Pink = 16 ppg Spacer
Blue = 8.6 ppg Seawater

JD - 0156

Bleed to 273 psi

16:57 - 17:05

4/20/10



Data

- Open kill line
- Pressure equalizes
  - Drillpipe pressure goes to 1400 psi
  - Kill line pressure drops to 645 psi
- Bleed pressure to 273 psi on drillpipe as kill line pressure drops to zero
  - DP pressure never gets to zero
- First time well is under balance
- Observed that fluid level in the riser had dropped

Interpretation

- U-tube between drill pipe and kill line due to heavy fluid in the annulus
- Suspect the annular is leaking

Legend

Green = 14 ppg Mud
Pink = 16 ppg Spacer
Blue = 8.6 ppg Seawater

Drillpipe Pressure Builds / Fill Riser

17:05 - 17:25

4/20/10



Data

- Shut in drillpipe
- Pressure builds to 1250 psi in 6 minutes
- Filled the riser with 50bbls from trip tank
- **Mud offload to Bankston ends at 17:17**
  - **Mudloggers not informed that offloading had ceased**

Interpretation

- **If the annular was leaking it is now sealed**
- **Discussion on rig floor about pressure on drillpipe**
  - **Decision made to conduct negative test on kill line**

Legend

Green = 14 ppg Mud
Pink = 16 ppg Spacer
Blue = 8.6 ppg Seawater

Bleed from 1202 to 0 psi

17:27 - 17:52

4/20/10



15 bbl

Cumulative Gain



Legend

Green = 14 ppg Mud
Pink = 16 ppg Spacer
Blue = 8.6 ppg Seawater

Data

- **Bleed drillpipe from 1202 to 0 psi**
- **IBOP is then closed**

Interpretation

- Witness statements indicate 15 bbls taken at this bleed
  - Normal compressibility would be approximately 5 bbls
  - Influx from the well is suspected

Duncan, Jeff

From: Keefe, Jessica L [Jessica.Keefe@wilmerhale.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2010 7:46 PM
To: Goo, Michael; Jim Massie
Subject: RE: Let me know
Attachments: 2010-05-24 Washington Briefing 2 of 2.zip

Categories: Red Category

Part two.

From: Goo, Michael [mailto:Michael.Goo@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2010 7:42 PM
To: Jim Massie; Keefe, Jessica L
Subject: RE: Let me know

I still don't have it but maybe its getting rejected in my email box? Thanks much.

From: Jim Massie [mailto:jmassie@alpinegroup.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2010 7:07 PM
To: Goo, Michael; Jessica.Keefe@wilmerhale.com
Subject: Re: Let me know

Jessica. Can you send to michael. I have it but can't forward it. Thank u.

From: Goo, Michael <Michael.Goo@mail.house.gov>
To: Jim Massie
Sent: Wed May 26 19:02:16 2010
Subject: RE: Let me know

I don't have it.

From: Jim Massie [mailto:jmassie@alpinegroup.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2010 6:35 PM
To: Goo, Michael
Subject: Let me know

If u got it. Its huge

Bleed Kill Line / Pressure Builds Gradually

17:52 - 18:40

4/20/10



18 bbl
15 bbl

Cumulative Gain



Data

- **Pressure monitored through cement unit quickly rises to 790 psi and falls**
- **Pressure slowly builds from 0 to 1400 psi over 31 minutes**

Interpretation

- **Start monitoring drillpipe pressure at cement unit**
- **Bleed 3-15 bbls from kill line to cement unit**
- **Cementer witness statement that well continued to flow and spurted**
- **Shut kill line and see pressure build**

Legend

Green = 14 ppg Mud
Pink = 16 ppg Spacer
Blue = 8.6 ppg Seawater

Pressure Holds – Negative Test

bp

18:40 - 19:55

4/20/10



18 bbl
15 bbl

Cumulative Gain



Data

- Drillpipe pressure (monitored at Halliburton) stays steady at 1400 psi
- Pumped on kill line to ensure full
- Bled off 0.2 bbls to trip tank
- Monitored kill line for 30 minutes
- Prepare to displace with seawater

Interpretation

- Discussion about pressure on the drillpipe
- No flow observed on kill line
- Rig team satisfied that test successful

Legend

Green = 14 ppg Mud
Pink = 16 ppg Spacer
Blue = 8.6 ppg Seawater

Displace to Seawater

bp

19:55 - 21:14

4/20/10



Data

- Pumped 1304 bbl seawater
  - Using rig pumps and booster
- Shut down for sheen test – spacer back
  - 1017 psi on DP when shut down
- Sheen test passes
- Crew instructed to divert returns overboard

Interpretation

- Flow out greater than flow in commencing at 20:58 while slowing pumps for spacer return
- Second indication of flow at 21:08 when pumps shutdown for sheen test
  - Pressure builds to 1263 over 5.5 minute period
  - Flow meter indicates well flowing

Three Flow Indicators

bp



Critical Factor 2: Flow Indication #1
51 minutes before explosion

- Following final integrity test of wellbore, BOP annular was opened and well displacement of mud to seawater began:
  - Flow-out volume of mud and drillpipe pressure showed expected correlation until about 20:58
  - At 20:58, pumps were slowed and the following abnormal results:
    - Drillpipe pressure increased from 1250 psi to 1350 psi
    - Flow-out volume increased instead of slowing
  - Flow-out vs flow-in shows gain of approx 57 bbls over 12 minute period
  - First indication of flow ~51 minutes before the explosion



Three Flow Indicators



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

Critical Factor 2: Flow Indication #2
41 minutes before explosion

- At 21:08 – pump shutdown as spacer observed at surface. Sheen test required.
  - Flow-out should be zero, but real-time data indicates well flowing after pump shut off
  - Drillpipe pressure increased from 1017 psi to 1263 psi over 5.5 minute period of sheen test

Ex) Normal Flow Back @ 16:52



Flow Back @ 21:08



Resume Displacement

Draft – Work in Progress. Subject to Revision

21:14 - 21:49

4/20/10



Data

- Resume displacement
  - Pump another 265 bbls
  - Returns going overboard
  - Flow meter bypassed – unable to monitor flow out
- Pumps stop at 21:31
- Significant pressure buildup starting at 21:47
- Data lost at 21:49
  - Last pressure reading 5700 psi

Interpretation

- Pumps stop at 21:31 – suspect problem identified with well
- 4 calls made from rig floor and Chief Mate discusses well with Toolpusher on rig floor
- Suspect explosion at 21:49
- EDS at 21:56 by Captain

Critical Factor 2: Flow Indication #3
18 minutes before explosion

- Sheen test passed and approval granted to discharge overboard
- At 21:14, pumping resumed to continue displacement to seawater
- At 21:31, problem observed (e.g. mud returns, abnormal pressures)
  - Pump abruptly shutdown
  - Drillpipe pressure at time of shutdown was 1240 psi. Increased to 1750 psi over next 6 minutes.
  - Flow-out data not available due to fluids being discharged directly overboard (bypasses flowmeter)



Final 18 Minutes

bp



BOP - EDS (Emergency Disconnect) Function

bp

- EDS was activated from Bridge after explosion at 21:56 based on witness statements
  - Activation time for EDS is 46 seconds
- The EDS function can be activated from the surface (either the bridge or drill floor).
  - Function is to seal the well and disconnect the vessel from the well.
- The EDS sequence:
  - Operator on rig pushes the EDS button
  - Blind shear rams close cutting drill pipe and sealing the well
  - Choke and kill line valves are closed and lines unlatched
  - LMRP is unlatched and disconnects
  - The EDS sequence is now complete and rig is free to move away from well.
- In this event there is no evidence that the EDS activated, there was still significant flow from the well and the LMRP remained connected to the BOP.

BOP - AMF (Dead-man) Function

- The AMF would have been expected to seal the well after loss of the three functions (hydraulics, communications and power) from the surface at some point between the explosions and the rig sinking.
- The AMF is an emergency sequence that activates the blind shear rams to seal the well.
  - Activation time for the AMF is 37 seconds
- The AMF sequence:
  - The BOP senses the loss of hydraulics, communications, power from the surface (all three need to be lost) and arms the AMF.
  - The AMF Activates the Blind shear rams cutting drill pipe and sealing the well.
  - Note that the AMF does not disconnect the LMRP.
- There is no evidence to suggest that the AMF in this case activated effectively to seal the well.

BOP - ROV Hot Stab Intervention and Surveys post incident

bp

- Post the explosion, numerous ROV hot stab interventions were conducted in an attempt to activate
  - Blind Shear rams
  - Variable Pipe rams
  - LMRP Disconnect (Auto shear cut in attempt to activate blind shear rams)
- ROV survey found a number of hydraulic leaks on the system
- ROV identified hydraulic system errors such that test rams were being activated instead of lower variable rams
- ROV identified undocumented modifications to the hydraulic control system; the extent of these modifications is unknown at this time
- Non-destructive examination using ultra-sonics and gamma source were conducted to try and detect position of rams and locks
  - There are indications that the BOP blind shear and variable rams have moved and may be in the locked position, final determination may be possible with the recovery of the BOP

Immediate Lines of Inquiry

- Maintenance
  - Were the BOP and control system properly maintained?
- Testing
  - Was the BOP properly tested within regulation; were the primary emergency systems EDS, AMF, Autoshear and ROV Hot Stabs tested regularly?
- Modifications
  - Are there as built diagrams of all modifications; is there a record of acceptance testing prior to running the BOP?
  - Did modifications conducted over life of BOP impact functionality?
- Leaks
  - Did hydraulic leaks found during ROV interventions and previously noted in Rig log impact functionality?

bp

Backup material

BOP Function Description

Draft – Work in Progress. Subject to Revision



- **UAP Upper Annular Preventer used in normal drilling operations for well shut-in rated 10K.**
- **LAP Lower Annular Preventer with Casing Stripping Element.. Used for casing stripping purposes, down rated to lower wellbore retaining pressure 5K.**
- **BSR Blind Shear Rams Cuts drill pipe and seals the well.**
- **CSR Casing Shear Rams Non-Sealing, cuts drill pipe and casing; is not designed to seal the wellbore.**
- **UPR Upper Pipe Rams Ram packers can close on a range of drill pipe from 3 ½" OD to 6 5/8" OD and seal up to 15K wellbore pressure.**
- **MPR Middle Pipe Rams Ram packers can close on a range of drill pipe from 3 ½" OD to 6 5/8" OD and seals up to 15K wellbore pressure, can also be stripped through to hang-off drill pipe up 600K**
- **LPR Lower Pipe Rams . Test Ram seals up to 15K pressure from above.**


bp


Shoe Track
Flappers Open
Drilling Mud
Guide Shoe



JD - 0180



JD - 0181

Seal Assembly With Casing Hanger Lock Down Sleeve

Draft – Work in Progress. Subject to Revision

bp

18-3/4 Type SS-15 Seal Assembly





18-3/4" SS-15 Big Bore II Well Head Housing

18-3/4X9-7/8" SS-15 CSG HGR Lock Down Sleeve

36 x 1-1/2" Wall SS-15 Housing

Load Ring

9-7/8" Casing

9-7/8" SS-15 Casing Hanger & Dummy Hanger

Seal Assembly Without Casing Hanger Lock Down Sleeve

bp





18-3/4" SS-15 Big Bore II Well Head Housing

36 x 1-1/2" Wall SS-15 Housing

Load Ring

9-7/8" Casing

9-7/8" SS-15 Casing Hanger & Dummy Hanger

Seal Assembly Cross Sectional View

Draft – Work In Progress. Subject to Revision

bp



6″ Seal Area

Lockdown Sleeve

Upper Housing

Lower Housing

Snap Lock Ring

Background to Incident

bp

24 May, 2010

- Macondo Prospect MC 252 ILX well - total depth 18,360'
  - Challenging well to drill but comfortably within experience range
  - The well was originally spud with the Marianas Rig on Oct 6th 2009 - The Marianas sustained damages during Hurricane *Ida* on Nov 8th and commenced tow to shipyard for repairs on Nov 26th
  - The Deep Water Horizon re-entered the well on Feb 9th 2010 at the 18" casing point
  - Both rigs are Transocean owned
  - The well encountered commercial hydrocarbons - plan was to temporarily suspend the well for future completion as a production well
- Deepwater Horizon
  - On contract to BP since 2001
  - Proven track record in deepwater exploration drilling (just came off record Tiber exploration well)
- Event
  - Incident occurred during the suspension phase of the well - 2 hrs after completing an integrity test on the well
  - At the time of the incident drilling fluid was being displaced from the well with seawater in preparation for setting the final cement plug

Duncan, Jeff

From: Freedhoff, Michal
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2010 1:58 PM
To: Gray, Morgan; Goo, Michael; Duncan, Jeff; Joseph, Avenel; Unruh-Cohen, Ana
Subject: FW: document
Attachments: BP Presentation 5.25.2010.pdf

Categories: Red Category

Here it is. See below re letting HAW break the news.

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.
Policy Director
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey (D-MA)
2108 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-2836

Sign-up to receive e-updates from Rep. Markey at http://markey.house.gov/signup

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From: Fuchs, Meredith
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2010 1:55 PM
To: Beauvais, Joel; Freedhoff, Michal
Cc: Leviss, David; Dotson, Greg
Subject: document

(APOLOGIES ABOUT UPPER CASE, MY COMPUTER IS MALFUNCTIONING)

ATTACHED IS THE DOCUMENT THAT MR. WAXMAN WILL INTRODUCE FOR THE RECORD TODAY AT THE HEARING, WHICH YOU CALLED A MOMENT AGO TO DISCUSS. WE ASK THAT YOU PERMIT HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTRODUCE THIS DOCUMENT WITH HIS REMARKS, AS HE WILL BE SPEAKING ABOUT ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN HIS SHORT OPENING STATEMENT. PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS.

Meredith Fuchs
Chief Investigative Counsel

Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
316 Ford House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Tel: 202-226-2424

Duncan, Jeff

From: Freedhoff, Michal
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2010 3:03 PM
To: Goo, Michael; Gray, Morgan; Unruh-Cohen, Ana; Joseph, Avenel; Duncan, Jeff; Baussan, Danielle
Subject: Fw: Letter from Mark Bly
Attachments: May 26 Bly Letter to O&I.PDF

Categories: Red Category

Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.
Policy Director
Office of Representative Edward J. Markey
2108 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-2836

Sent using BlackBerry

From: Fuchs, Meredith
To: Freedhoff, Michal; Beauvais, Joel
Sent: Thu May 27 15:01:15 2010
Subject: FW: Letter from Mark Bly

The attached will be of interest. It is a letter by BP in response to Mr. Waxman and Stupak's memo from Tuesday. Mr. Waxman and Stupak are putting out a memo circulating this to the Committee today with the 48 page presentation. The memo does not address all of the issues in the BP letter, and I would be happy to provide my point by point reaction if you want. This was most of what made us so busy this a.m. and last minute on Mr. Waxman's statement. We had not intended to release the BP presentation until we received their letter very later last night.

From: Cobbs, Rob
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2010 2:48 PM
To: Leviss, David; Dotson, Greg; Cassady, Alison; Cohen, Brian; Neubauer, Ali; Benjamin, Tiffany; Owens, Jennifer; Horowitz, Art; Franklin, Derrick; Gaston, Molly
Cc: Fuchs, Meredith
Subject: RE: Letter from Mark Bly

That's interesting – I don't remember anything about them stopping the 1st test early. My impression was definitely that they had received an unsatisfactory result.

In any case, should we post this? I think some of those clarifications would be useful to anyone following the investigation.

Rob

From: Leviss, David
Sent: Thursday, May 27, 2010 2:39 PM
To: Dotson, Greg; Cassady, Alison; Cobbs, Rob; Cohen, Brian; Neubauer, Ali; Benjamin, Tiffany; Owens, Jennifer; Horowitz, Art; Franklin, Derrick; Gaston, Molly
Cc: Fuchs, Meredith
Subject: FW: Letter from Mark Bly

Here is a letter that BP sent us last night responding to our memo on their briefing.

David J. Leviss
Chief Oversight Counsel
Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
Tel: 202-226-2424

From: Reicherts, Elizabeth A [mailto:Liz.Reicherts@bp.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2010 9:14 PM
To: Leviss, David; Fuchs, Meredith; Golden, Ali; Cardille, Stacia; Spencer, Peter; Schloegel, Scott
Subject: Letter from Mark Bly

Folks: Sending a letter to you on behalf of Mark Bly. Let me know if you have any questions.
regards,
Liz

Liz Reicherts
Sr. Director, US Government & International Affairs
BP America Inc.
1101 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005
202.457.6585 direct
202.669.9892 cell

bp

May 26, 2010

BY ELECTRONIC DELIVERY

Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman
Committee on Energy and Commerce
United States House of Representatives
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-6115

Hon. Bart Stupak, Chairman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
United States House of Representatives
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-6115

Dear Chairman Waxman and Chairman Stupak:

I am BP's Group Vice President for Safety & Operations and the leader of BP's internal investigation of the April 20 incident involving the Transocean *Deepwater Horizon* drill rig. My team, made up of individuals both internal and external to BP, comprises more than 70 engineers, technical specialists, and other businesspeople with relevant expertise. My team leaders and I appreciated the opportunity to brief your staff on May 25 regarding our preliminary perspectives on the incident and our areas of focus for continuing inquiry. I have subsequently reviewed your May 25, 2010 Memorandum entitled "Key Questions Arising from Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill," which I understand that your staff prepared following the briefing, and I write to clarify several statements it contains.

First, my team and I have not prepared and did not provide an "interim report" on the incident. We have drawn no conclusions at this point, preliminary or otherwise, because our investigation is ongoing, and we have not had access to certain key pieces of evidence that might enable us to make such conclusions. The initial perspectives we communicated yesterday and that are reflected in the draft presentation we provided to you are based on our post-incident review of the data and witness statements to which we have had access to this point.

Second, I respectfully submit below clarifications to several statements in the Memorandum. For ease of your reference, I have quoted the statement and then offered clarifying comments:

- "According to BP there were three flow indicators from the well before the explosion."

  As my team and I shared with your staff on May 25, the BP Investigation Team has conducted a post-incident review of the Halliburton (Sperry Sun) data. The team believes that this data suggests that there were three occasions within the 51 minutes

prior to the explosion in which abnormal well conditions could have been observed. These indications involved drill pipe pressure abnormalities and mud outflow from the well.

- "As early as 5:05 p.m., almost 5 hours before the explosion, an unexpected loss of fluid was observed in the riser pipe, suggesting that there were leaks in the annular preventer in the BOP."

  The BP Investigation team believes, based on review of the Halliburton data described above and witness interviews, that, in preparation for the negative test, the rig crew bled a volume of fluid from the drill pipe and subsequently refilled the riser. As my team and I shared with your staff on May 25, this information suggests that, in the period prior to the rig crew's conducting the negative test, there was fluid leaking from the space above the annular preventer to the space below the annular preventer. Based on a review of the data, the rig crew appears subsequently to have corrected this leak.

- "A cementer witness stated that the 'well continued to flow and spurted.'"

  As my team and I shared with your staff on May 25, the BP Investigation Team learned, in an interview with a Halliburton employee, that, during the negative test, this employee observed a brief flow on the kill line. This interviewee did not say that he observed "the well" flowing.

- "Having received an unacceptable result from conducting the negative pressure test through the drill pipe, the pressure test was then moved to the kill line where a volume of fluid came out when the line was opened."

  The BP Investigation team believes that the rig crew performed the negative test on the kill line not because of an "unacceptable result" on the drill pipe test, but because the BP well site leader instructed the rig crew to stop the drill pipe test and conduct the test on the kill line in order to meet the requirements of the MMS permit and to adhere to the drilling plan, both of which specified a negative test conducted on the kill line. The drill pipe test had not been completed when the test was conducted on the kill line.

- "Moreover, the float test performed after cementing may not have been definitive, leading to concern that there may have been contamination of the cement due to density differences between the cement and the drilling mud."

  The BP Investigation Team understands that the "float test" to which the Memorandum refers is an operational check (as opposed to a required test) that the rig crew uses to determine if the float valves are holding. This operational check looks for a significant hydrostatic pressure differential between the fluids in the annulus and the casing; in the case of this well, the pressures in the two fluid columns were nearly at balance during this check. As my team and I shared with your staff on May 25, we

have seen no evidence to suggest that this test "le[d] to concern that there may have been contamination of the cement" at that time. In its post-incident review of data, the team has postulated that contamination, if it occurred at all, might have occurred as a result of the heavier cement mixing with the lighter drilling fluid in the pilot hole.

As for the testing of the float collar, that equipment was tested positively and negatively during the integrity test of the well, subsequent to the operational check described above.

- "In addition, the method of displacing the drilling mud with seawater may have interfered with the monitoring of the flow levels from the well because the mud was transferred to another boat instead of measured in the mud pits."

There are two independent means of monitoring mud flow levels from a well – the flow meter and mud pit levels. The BP Investigation Team believes that, on the afternoon of April 20, the cleaning of pits, transfer of fluids between pits, and offloading of mud to a support vessel may have complicated the rig crew's monitoring of the pit levels. The "method of displacing the drilling mud with seawater," in and of itself, would not be a complicating factor.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to brief your staff yesterday. If you have any questions regarding this correspondence, please feel free to contact me directly.

Sincerely,

Mark R. Bly

Duncan, Jeff

From: Barnett, Phil
Sent: Saturday, May 29, 2010 7:38 PM
To: Goo, Michael
Subject: Fw: Documents referred to in NYT Story
Attachments: BP-HZN-CEC018442.pdf; BP-HZN-CEC008333 Casing Design.pdf; BP-HZN-CEC017494 Weekly Report 4.14.2010 (major risks - hole stability).pdf; BP-HZN-CEC018375.pdf; BP-HZN-CEC018384.pdf; BP-HZN-CEC018441.pdf

Categories: Yellow Category

Fyi ...

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld (www.BlackBerry.net)

From: Fuchs, Meredith
To: Barnett, Phil
Sent: Sat May 29 19:31:39 2010
Subject: Documents referred to in NYT Story

Phil, here are documents on the topics discussed in the NYT story today.

Meredith <<BP-HZN-CEC018442.pdf>> <<BP-HZN-CEC008333 Casing Design.pdf>> <<BP-HZN-CEC017494 Weekly Report 4.14.2010 (major risks - hole stability).pdf>> <<BP-HZN-CEC018375.pdf>> <<BP-HZN-CEC018384.pdf>> <<BP-HZN-CEC018441.pdf>>

From: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2009 9:50 AM
To: Labiche, Lance
Cc: Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting); Gray, George E
Subject: RE: Hurricane Rig Damage question
Lance,

Thanks - we will put in next week's WAR.

We were already shut down before Ida for BOP repairs, and we will remain shut down until these repairs are complete. Not sure about the timing yet but Transocean's assessment team will be at the rig today and we will know more about what the repairs will encompass after that.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
281.366.6843 (office)
713.702.7673 (cell)

From: Labiche, Lance [mailto:Lance.Labiche@mms.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2009 9:29 AM
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Subject: Re: Hurricane Rig Damage question

Scherie,

You can take care of that with mentioning it in the WAR. Any estimate on how long repairs will take? Are well operations shutdown until the repairs are made?

Thanks
Lance

Sent from blackberry

From: Douglas, Scherie D <Scherie.Douglas@bp.com>
To: Labiche, Lance
Sent: Tue Nov 17 07:14:37 2009
Subject: Hurricane Rig Damage question

Lance,

We were troubleshooting an electrical short on the Marianas (anchor winch 3 & 4) over the weekend. We had to get scaffolding erected to get under the main deck where we discovered electrical wiring damage incurred during Ida. Transocean has a team going to the rig to assess the extent of the damage and what repairs will look like.

My question is - do you want that in a hurricane rig damage report? Or should I just report it in the Weekly Activity Report?

Thanks.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
281.366.6843 (office)
713.702.7673 (cell)

Evaluation of Casing Design Basis for

Macondo Prospect

Mississippi Canyon Block 252

OCS-G-32306 Well No.1

Revision 2

14 May 2009

Steve Morey
EPT Drilling

EPT

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Casing Summary

Macondo Prospect: Based on the detailed analysis the following tubulars are recommended:

Jet:	36" 552.69 ppf, 1.500" wall, Grade X80, NOV/GP XLW
Conductor:	28" 218.27 ppf, 0.750" wall, Grade X56, NOV/GP XLW
Surface:	22" 224.49 ppf, 1.000" wall, Grade X80, NOV/GP XLF
Surface Liner:	18" 116.09 ppf, 0.625" wall, Grade P110, TenarisHydril 511
Intermediate:	16" 96.00 ppf, 0.575" wall, Grade P110, TenarisHydril 511
Intermediate Liner:	13-5/8" 88.20 ppf, 0.625" wall, Grade Q125, VAM SLIJ-II
SET Drilling Liner:	12.140" 46.55 ppf, 0.370" wall, Grade EX80, XPC
Production Casing:	9-7/8" 62.8 ppf, 0.625" wall, Grade Q125, VAM SLIJ-II

Casing weights and grades were selected by; 1) the minimum required to meet the design requirements, and/or 2) standardized combinations for ease of procurement and minimization of BP OCTG stock, and/or 3) the standard tubulars for DW GOM wells. To use up BP stock other connections from the BP Approved Connection List for the are acceptable. The SF_A could change with a change in connection, but nothing significant is anticipated. Based on the above tubular recommendations, a dispensation from the BP Drilling and Well Operations Policy is required for the 22" Surface casing, 16" Intermediate casing, 12.140" Drilling liner, and 9-7/8" Production casing.

Revision 1 changes the 16" from 109.00 ppf and a full string to 96.00 ppf and a liner with the TOL in the 22" 1.500" wall X80 surface casing. Also the 11-7/8" drilling liner is changed to a 13.625" SET.

Revision 2 changes the setting depth of the 22", 18", 16", 13-5/8" and 11-7/8". PTD is changed to 20200 ft and the PP and FG were revised slightly.

This is a sub-sea well designed for production. Evaluation for the mitigation for APB (Annular Pressure Build-up), for the drilling case, is recommended.

Introduction

The design basis for this well was evaluated using the BP Casing Design Manual (CDM) recommended loads (see Tables B.1 – B.4), the requirements of the BP Drilling and Well Operations Policy (DWOP), and the Advanced Guidelines for Deepwater Well Design. The evaluation was done using the Landmark StressCheck Version 2003.16 Build 1061 software.

Burst: Current suggested BP drilling design load recommendations for internal yield, or burst, are based on a gas gradient to the surface equivalent to the formation fracture pressure at the casing shoe, ***Frac @ Shoe w/Gas Gradient Above*** (FAS), internal with pore pressure in the open hole and mud and/or cement mix fluid density inside pipe external, for drilling loads. The secondary ***Gas Kick Profile*** (GKP) is based on a 100 bbl influx and a kick intensity (KI) of 2.0 ppg. The use of the Limited Kick (LK) load

case, with a statistically calculated kick intensity (KI) per CDM BPA-D-003 6.5.2, has been discontinued. For development wells, where no hydrocarbons are expected before the next casing string is set, a load case based on a water gradient to surface equivalent to the formation fracture pressure at the casing shoe, ***Lost Returns with Water*** (LRW), internal with pore pressure and mud and/or cement mix fluid density external, for drilling loads, may be used. A fourth drilling load case that may be considered is based on historical data that implies that kicks generally have an influx of no more than 20 bbl and that the surface pressure is infrequently greater than 1/3 the BHP, ***Frac @ Shoe w/1/3 BHP at Surface*** (1/3 BHP). For production loads, the burst recommendation is based on a ***Tubing Leak*** at the surface plus the hydrostatic head of the packer fluid (TL) internal with pore pressure and mud and/or cement mix fluid density external. For injection applications (water injection, formation fracturing, etc.) the load cases are ***Stimulation Surface Leak*** (SSL) and ***Injection Down Casing*** (IDC) The SSL models maximum injection pressure at the surface plus the hydrostatic head of the packer fluid internal, with pore pressure and mud and/or cement mix fluid density external. The IDC models maximum injection pressure at the surface plus the hydrostatic head of the injection fluid internal, with pore pressure and mud and/or cement mix fluid density external.

Collapse: The collapse recommendation for drilling loads is based on ***Lost Returns with Mud Drop*** (LRMD) until the hydrostatic head equalizes with the loss formation pore pressure. The default is maximum exposed drilling mud density internal below the fluid level and the mud density pipe was set in external. More extreme could be the ***Partial/Full Evacuation*** (P/F Evac) load case depending on the fluid level and internal fluid density selected. For production loads the mud density the casing was set in is external with full evacuation internal below the packer and packer fluid density above the packer internal, ***Above/Below Packer*** (A/B Pkr).

Abbreviations

1/3 BHP: Burst load case for fracture at shoe w/1/3 BHP at Surface
A/B Pkr: Collapse load case for Above/Below Packer
APB: Annular Pressure Build-up due to thermal effects and trapped annuli
bbl: Barrel/barrels of fluid
BML: Below mud line
BU: Back-up, external fluid
CDM: BP Casing Design Manual, BPA-D-003
CMTG: Collapse load case for cementing operations
DWOP: BP Drilling and Well Operations Policy, BPA-D-001
IDC: Burst load case for Injection Down Casing
FAS: Burst load case for Frac @ Shoe w/Gas Gradient Above
KI: Kick intensity
GKP: Burst load case for Gas Kick Profile
LRMD: Collapse load case for Lost Returns with Mud Drop
LRW: Burst load case for Lost Returns with Water
m: meters
MD: Measured depth
MIY: Minimum Internal Yield
PP: Pore pressure

P/F Evac: Collapse load case for Partial/Full Evacuation
ppf: Pounds per foot, mass of steel tubes
ppg: pounds per gallon, density of fluid
PT: Pressure test
PTD: Proposed total depth
SF_X: Safety factors; $_B$-burst, $_C$-collapse, $_A$-axial $_{VME}$-triaxial
sg: Specific gravity
SSC: Sulfide Stress Cracking
SSL: Burst load case for Stimulation Surface Leak
TL: Burst load case for Tubing leak
TOC: Top of cement
TOL: Top of liner
TVD: True vertical depth

Macondo Prospect Description

This evaluation is for a medium pressured, average temperature, 20600 ft TVD/MD development well with an anticipated maximum PP of 13.8 ppg (14780 psi) at PTD. The bottom hole temperature is estimated at 267°F. The well will be drilled as a subsea well in 4992 ft of water. Pore pressures, fracture gradients, temperatures, casing sizes, and setting depths were supplied by the Macondo Prospect drilling team based on geophysical, geological, and offset information, see attachments 1, 2, and 3.

Figure 1: Macondo Prospect MC252 Proposed Formation Pressure Profiles R2



The casing pressure test (PT) loads were selected to provide results at or near the worst case burst load and have not been checked for compliance with any government requirements. The final design factors do not include any allowance for casing wear.

Figure 2: Macondo Prospect MC252Proposed Casing R2



Macondo Prospect Design Detail

Jet: 36" 552.69 ppf, 1.500" wall, Grade X80, NOV/GP XLW set 5081-5361 ft.
Meets the BP DWOP requirements. No dispensation required.

Conductor: 28" 218.27 ppf, 0.750" wall, Grade X56, NOV/GP XLW set 5081-6275 ft.
Meets the BP DWOP requirements. No dispensation required.

Surface: 22" 277.27 ppf, 1.250" wall Grade X80 DQ S90 set 4992-5175; 22" 224.49 ppf, 1.000" wall, Grade X80, NOV/GP XLF set 5081-8000 ft.
Does not meet the BP DWOP requirements.

a) FAS: SF_B 0.83, SF_{VME} 0.99 w/7.6 ppg BU

Changing the load to a GKP load case, based on a 100 bbl influx with a KI of 2.0 ppg, results in acceptable design factors.

b) GKP: SF_B 2.26, SF_{VME} 2.55 w/7.6 ppg BU

Note: The above factors are based on top of the 16" liner being hung in the supplemental adapter in the 1.250" wall section. If the 1.000" wall pipe is exposed the factors will be lower, but still acceptable.

A dispensation is required to use the BP GKP load case for the burst load case.

Surface Liner: 18" 116.09 ppf, 0.625" wall, Grade P110, TenarisHydril 511 set 7600-9900 ft
Meets the BP DWOP requirements. No dispensation required.

a) FAS: SF_B 2.22, SF_{VME} 2.78 w/7.6 ppg BU

Intermediate Casing: 16" 96.00 ppf, 0.575" wall, Grade P110, TenarisHydril 511 set 5121-12500 ft
Does not meet the BP DWOP burst design requirements.

a) FAS: SF_B 0.72, SF_{VME} 0.91 w/7.6 ppg BU

Changing the load to a GKP load case, based on a 100 bbl influx with a KI of 2.0 ppg, results in acceptable design factors.

b) GKP: SF_B 1.02, SF_{VME} 1.21 w/7.6 ppg BU

This result is close enough with the very conservative 7.6 ppg external fluid density, an increase of less than 1.0 ppg increases the SF_B and SF_{VME} factors to greater than the recommended minimum of 1.10 and 1.25 respectively.

A dispensation is required to use the BP GKP load case for the burst load case.

Intermediate Liner: 13-5/8" 88.20 ppf, 0.625" wall, Grade Q125, VAM SLIJ-II set 12200-15300 ft

Meets the BP DWOP requirements. No dispensation required.

a) FAS: SF_B 1.31, SF_{VME} 1.55 w/7.6 ppg BU

Drilling Liner: 12.140" 46.55 ppf, 0.370" wall, Grade EX80, XPC set 13700-17000 ft

Does not meet the BP DWOP burst design requirements.

a) FAS: SF_B 0.56, SF_{VME} 0.70 w/7.6 ppg BU

The minimum SF's in a) occur in the liner overlap section. SC does not understand liner geometry and uses the 7.6 ppg back-up fluid density from the TOC to the surface. This is not a reasonable assumption because even as the worst case, the 7.6 ppg density fluid would only extend to the TOL, not back to the surface. For liner applications we can assume that the minimum PP in the open hole section from the previous shoe is the fluid density in the liner overlap section (Mud weight above TOC). For this liner the minimum PP in the open hole section up to the 13-5/8" casing shoe is 12.2 ppg. This results in acceptable design factors.

b) FAS: SF_B 0.98, SF_{VME} 1.22 w/12.2 ppg BU above TOC and PP below TOC

The SET liner is basically a metal wall cake and is not intended for well control design applications, these results are pretty good.

A dispensation is required to use minimum open hole PP as the external fluid density for the FAS burst load case.

Attachment 4 is the Enventure SET data sheet from the same type of SET run in the Isabela well

Production Casing: 9-7/8" 62.80 ppf, 0.625" wall, Grade Q125 set 5081-20200 ft

Meets the BP DWOP production burst design requirements.

a) TL: SF_B 1.17, SF_{VME} 1.28 w/7.6 ppg BU

Does not meet the BP DWOP production collapse design requirements.

b) A/B Pkr: SF_C 0.71, w/a 0 ppg fluid density below the packer

To improve these results we can increase the collapse resistance of the pipe or decrease the collapse load requirements. The A/B Pkr load case default is a design with PP external and zero (0) pressure internal, this would simulate a well that would not flow and was jetted of all fluid to below the perforations. This would certainly be a worst case scenario; however I have seen it happen so know it can occur. If we assume that we will not jet the well dry, the minimum internal load is from a column of dry gas at the abandonment pressure, and the external load is original PP the collapse load is acceptable. I assumed an abandonment pressure of 5150 psi at the perforations or about 3130 psi (assuming 0.1 psi/ft) at the wellhead, which is equivalent to about 4.9 ppg fluid density.

c) A/B Pkr: SF_C 1.00, w/a 4.9 ppg fluid density below the packer

This Production casing design does not have tapered string for any potential large SSSV in the tubing string.

A dispensation is required to use the alternate fluid density below the packer for the production collapse load case.

Well Summary

The well summary table below, from StressCheck, is from the file that has the acceptable design/load case options discussed above for each casing string.

StressCheck Well Summary for the Macondo Prospect MC252 R2

String	OD/Weight/Grade	Connection	MD Interval (ft)	Drift Dia (in)	Minimum Safety Factors Burst	Collapse	Axial	Triaxial
Conductor Casing	36", 552.690 ppf, X-80	NOV/GP XLW	5081.0-5361.0	32.813	11.04 C	1.32	5.68 C	2.77
Conductor Casing	28", 218.270 ppf, X-56	NOV/GP XLW	5081.0-6275.0	26.313	2.63	1.60	3.73	2.93
Surface Casing	22", 277.270 ppf, X-80	NOV/GP XLW	5081.0-5175.0	19.313	2.26	8.07	4.69	2.55
	22", 224.490 ppf, X-80	N/A	5175.0-8000.0	19.813	1.72	3.08	4.36	2.00
Surface Liner	18", 116.090 ppf, P-110	Wedge 511	7600.0-9900.0	16.563	2.22	3.25	3.95 C	2.76
Intermediate Liner	16", 96.000 ppf, P-110	Wedge 511	5121.0-12500.0	14.75	* 1.03	2.90	1.75 C	* 1.23
Intermediate Liner	13 5/8", 88.200 ppf, Q-125	VAM SLIJ-II	12200.0-15500.0	12.250 A	1.31	3.83	3.06 C	1.55
Drilling Liner	12.140, 46.550 ppf, SET60	XPC	13700.0-17200.0	11.244	* 0.98 C	1.61	1.99 C	* 1.22
Production Casing	9 7/8", 62.800 ppf, Q-125	VAM SLIJ-II	5081.0-20200.0	8.500 A	1.18	1.00	2.00 C	1.28

* S.F. Below D.F.
C Conn Critical
A Alternate Drift

Attachment 1: Schematic and Well Data R2



Attachment 2: PP/MW/FG Pressure Prediction

MC 252 - Macondo Prospect , PP/MW/FG Pressure Prediction



Attachment 3: Well Data

Data for MMS PP/MW/FG chart - MC 252 Macondo - revB: 2/4/09

Feb 4, 2009 updated WD to 4992' from shallow hazard work

New casing depths: PP/MW/FG curves updated

added 192' for WD increase over original Draft Casing plan

Depth	PP	FG	PP + 0.25	FG - 0.5
5081	8.6	8.6		
5361	8.6	8.7		
6267	8.6	9.4		
7692	8.8	10.6	9.05	10.1
8192	9	11	9.25	10.5
10192	10.3	12.25	10.55	11.75
14192	12.35	14.15	12.6	13.65
19192	13.55	15.6	13.8	15.1
21000	13.8	16.05	14.05	15.55

Casing Point Data

Size	MD	PP	MW	FG	Top of Casing	Footage Req'd	Csg Wt./ft	Air String Wt. Klbs
ML	5081	8.6	8.6	8.6	-	-	-	-
36	5361	8.6	8.6	8.7	4865	496		
28	6275	8.6	8.6	9.4	4870	1405	218	306
22	7700	8.8	9.0	10.6	4865	2835	224	635
18	9500	9.8	10.1	11.8	7100	2400	117	281
16	11700	11.0	11.3	12.9	4905	6795	97	659
13.625	13850	12.1	12.4	14.0	11200	2650	88.2	234
11.875	17200	13.1	13.5	15.0	13150	4050	71.8	291
9.875	20600	13.8	14.2	16.0	4865	15735	62.3	980

Attachment 4: Isabla SET Data



Solid Expandable Tubular (SET™)

11,750 OD 47.0 lb/ft x 13.625 OD 88.2 lb/ft

ENVENTURE

Customer:	BP
Well Name:	MC252 #1 Isabella
ORT Number:	10251

External Base Casing

Nominal Outside Diameter	13.625 in.
Nominal Inside Diameter	12.375 in.
Nominal Drift Diameter	12.219 in.
Nominal Weight	88.20 lb/ft
Maximum Inside Diameter	12.459 in.
Casing Grade	HC95-125
Connection Type	Hydril 563
Connection ID (Pin Send)	12.359 in.
Customer Equipment ID Restriction (Other ID)	N/A

Running Conditions

SET String Length	3,000 ft
Dogleg Severity	6.0 °/100 ft
Dogleg Severity Stress	36,360 lb
Mud Weight	12.70 lb/gal
Bottomhole Temperature	200° F
Maximum Combined Tension	
Maximum Combined Compression	
Nominal Open Hole ID	14 in.

SET System Components

Expansion Cone Diameter	11.468 in.
Launcher Diameter	12.191 in.
Anchor Hanger - Set in Base Casing Clearance Thickness	0.235 in.
Anchor Hanger - Set in Open Hole Clearance Thickness	N/A
Connection Sleeves in Base Casing	0.000 in.
Connection Sleeves in Open Hole	0.156 in.

SET Liner / Launcher Properties

SET Liner Grade	HC95
SET Liner Nominal Yield Strength	95,000 psi
SET Liner Minimum Ultimate Strength	98,000 psi
Expansion Cone Outside Diameter	11.468 in.
Expansion Ratio	1.07
Launcher Outside Diameter	12.191 in.
Launcher Nominal Yield Strength	95,000 psi
Launcher Nominal Internal Yield Pressure	9,500 psi
Launcher Collapse Pressure	750 psi
Launcher - Base Casing Nominal ID Clearance	0.184 in.
Launcher - Base Casing Nominal ID Flow Area	3.542 in. sq.
Launcher OD - Open Hole ID Clearance	1.809 in.
Launcher OD - Open Hole ID Flow Area	22.212 in. sq.
Launcher OD - Base Casing Connection ID Clearance	0.059 in.
Launcher OD - Base Casing Connection ID Flow Area	3.604 in. sq.
Launcher OD - Base Casing Other ID Clearance	N/A
Launcher OD - Base Casing Other ID Flow Area	N/A

Pre-Expansion Connection Limitations

Down Hole Torque	9,000 ft-lb
Dogleg Severity	15.0 °/100 ft
Tension	660,100 lb
Compression	544,100 lb

Expansion Assembly Limitations

Down Hole Torque	N/A
Tension	N/A
Compression	N/A

Pre-Expansion Specification		Post-Expansion Specification	
SET Liner			
Nominal Outside Diameter	11.750 in.	Nominal Outside Diameter	12.576 in.
Nominal Inside Diameter	11.000 in.	Nominal Inside Diameter	11.468 in.
API Drift ID	10.844 in.	Expected Drift ID	11.296 in.
Nominal Wall Thickness	0.375 in.	Nominal Wall Thickness	0.370 in.
Nominal Weight	47.00 lb/ft	Nominal Weight	46.84 lb/ft
Internal Yield Pressure [1]	4,670 psi	Internal Yield Pressure [2]	4,270 psi
Collapse Pressure [1]	1,860 psi	Collapse Pressure [2]	1,410 psi
		Nominal Liner Shrinkage	1.36 %
KPC Connection			
Connection Joint Strength [3]	660,100 lb	Connection Joint Strength [3]	654,200 lb
Compression Load Rating [3]	544,100 lb	Compression Load Rating [3]	451,300 lb
Minimum Parting Load [4]	907,600 lb	Minimum Parting Load [4]	824,600 lb
Max. Pure Bend Rating [3,5]	15.0 °/100 ft	Max. Pure Bend Rating [3,5]	8.8 °/100 ft
Joint Efficiency (Tension)	63.4%	Joint Efficiency (Tension)	62.8%
Minimum Final Torque [6]	9,000 ft-lb		
Optimum Final Torque [6]	9,000 ft-lb		
Maximum Final Torque [6]	9,000 ft-lb		
Maximum Yield Torque [6]	9,000 ft-lb		

[1] Based on 80,000 psi yield strength, No Safety Factor Applied

[2] Joint strength is the elastic limit or yield strength of the connection

[3] Based on Connection NOT utilizing Connection Sleeves

[4] Minimum minimum parting load is the ultimate strength or parting load of the connection

[5] Torque values are recommended and can be affected by field conditions

[6] Based on Bend Angle Only, No additional loads being applied

ENVENTURE

Solid Expandable Tubular (SET™)
11.750 OD 47.0 lb/ft x 13.625 OD 88.2 lb/ft
for

Customer:
Well Name:
GMT Number:

Pre-Expanded Specification		Post-Expanded Specification	
Expansion Forces / Pressures			
Initiation Pressure		Initiation Force	
Pipe Body Expansion Pressure	650 psi	Pipe Body Expansion Force	96,700 lb
Anchor Hanger - Set in Base Casing Expansion Pressure		Anchor Hanger – Set in Base Casing Expansion Force	
Anchor Hanger - Set in Open Hole Expansion Pressure		Anchor Hanger – Set in Open Hole Expansion Force	
Connection Sleeve Expansion Pressure in Base Casing		Connection Sleeve Expansion Force in Base Casing	
Connection Sleeve Expansion Pressure in Open Hole		Connection Sleeve Expansion Force in Open Hole	
Connection Sleeves (CS) in the Base Casing			
Sleeve Thickness	0.060 in.	Post-Expansion Sleeve Thickness	0.070 in.
Pre-Expansion Outside Diameter	12.156 in.	Post-Expansion Outside Diameter	12.298 in.
CS OD - Base Casing Drift ID Clearance	0.063 in.	Nominal Casing ID To CS OD Clearance	0.077 in.
CS OD - Base Casing Nominal ID Clearance	0.203 in.	Pre-Sleeve ID To CS OD Clearance	-0.009 in.
CS OD - Base Casing Connection ID Clearance	0.134 in.	Other ID To CS OD Clearance	N/A
CS OD - Base Casing Other ID Clearance	N/A		
"+0.000" = Diametrical Clearance			
"-0.000" = Diametrical Interference			
Connection Sleeves in the Open Hole			
Sleeve Thickness	0.100 in.	Post-Expansion Sleeve Thickness	0.070 in.
Pre-Expansion Outside Diameter	12.372 in.	Post-Expansion Outside Diameter	12.298 in.
CS OD - Base Casing Drift ID Clearance	0.047 in.	Open Hole Nominal ID To CS OD Clearance	1.642 in.
CS OD - Base Casing Nominal ID Clearance	0.203 in.		
CS OD - Base Casing Connection ID Clearance	0.118 in.		
CS OD - Base Casing Other ID Clearance	N/A		
CS OD - Open Hole Nominal ID Clearance	1.626 in.		
"+0.000" = Diametrical Clearance			
"-0.000" = Diametrical Interference			
Anchor Hanger - Set In Base Casing			
Elastomer Thickness	0.220 in.	Post-Expansion Outside Diameter	12.376 in.
Outside Diameter With Elastomer	12.156 in.		
Anchor Hanger OD - Base Casing Drift ID Clearance	0.063 in.	Elastomer Compression at Nominal Internal Diameter	45.37 %
Anchor Hanger OD - Base Casing Nominal ID Clearance	0.183 in.	Elastomer Compression at Maximum Internal Diameter	17.28 %
Anchor Hanger OD - Base Casing Connection ID Clearance	0.100 in.		
Anchor Hanger OD - Base Casing Other ID Clearance	N/A	Elastomer Compression at Base Casing Connection ID	34.66 %
Anchor Hanger - Set In Open Hole			
Elastomer Thickness	N/A	Post-Expansion Outside Diameter	N/A
Outside Diameter With Elastomer	N/A		
Nominal Open Hole Diameter	N/A	Elastomer Compression at Nominal Open Hole Diameter	N/A
Maximum Open Hole Diameter	N/A	Elastomer Compression at Maximum Open Hole Diameter	N/A
Anchor Hanger OD - Base Casing Drift ID Clearance	N/A		
Anchor Hanger OD - Base Casing Nominal ID Clearance	N/A		
Anchor Hanger OD - Base Casing Connection ID Clearance	N/A		
Anchor Hanger OD - Base Casing Other ID Clearance	N/A		
Anchor Hanger OD - Open Hole Nominal Diameter Clearance	N/A		

Macondo Discovery









Prospect Name:	**Macondo**
Lease:	MC252
Water depth:	-4913
Trap:	4-way (DHI support)
Target(s):	M56 (M54/M55 upside)
GDE:	Channel Levee
Prospect acres:	2,000 – 4,000
Unrisked Volume:	40 - 64 - 94 mmboe (gross; M56 only)
Gross Vol drainable:	32 – 51 – 75 mmboe (from BP block)
Critical risks:	Charge Access
Ps:	0.67
WI:	BP 65%, APC 25%; Mitsui 10%

Macondo Discovery



~ 90' of net pay







Prospect Name:	**Macondo**
Lease:	MC252
Water depth:	-4913
Trap:	4-way (DHI support)
Target(s):	M56 – Middle Miocene
GDE:	Channel Levee
Prospect acres:	2,000 – 4,000
Unrisked Volume:	40 - 64 - 94 mmboe (gross; M56 only)
Gross Vol drainable:	32 – 51 – 75 mmboe (from BP block)
Net Pay:	Predicted 95' and found ~ 90'
WI:	BP 65%, APC 25%; Mitsui 10%

Operations: Conducting wireline logging program

- Completed Triple Combo, OBMI
- Running MDT, Sidewall core, checkshot
- After logging program, will run 7" production casing



Macondo_MC 252 #1 April 21.xls

21/04/2010



DD II (Transocean) Deepwater Horizon (Transocean) Discoverer Enterprise (Transocean)

BP GOM DEEPWATER SPU

D&C Weekly Operations Report

Rpt Period April 07 – April 13, 2010



PDQ (Pride) DD III (Transocean)

http://gomdrc.bpweb.bp.com/docs/Documents/Weekly%20Reports/

GoM SPU – D&C OPERATIONS WEEKLY REPORT

Rig:	Deepwater Horizon (Transocean)	Well Name (OpenWells):	OCS-G 32306 MC 252 #1

OBJECTIVES:

Technical Scope	Exploratory well. Drill and evaluate the Miocene intervals.				
Business Delivery	**Asset**	**Prod Rate** (net mboed, 2010 Annualized)	**Key Dates – current activity** (mm-dd-yy)		
			START rig ops	**END** rig ops	**1st Prod**
	DWX	NA	1/31/2010	4/24/2010	NA
Other / comments	BP CONFIDENTIAL				

HSE:

	DAFWC (count)	**Recordables** (count)	**First Aids** (count)	**HIPO** (count)	**Spills** (# / bbls)	**MMS INC** (count)
Week	0	0	2	0	0	0
Incidents	1-4/7/10 Foot slip on staircase, 1-4/10/10 moved leg back and hit angle iron brace on tool, 1-4/8/10 drop object – washer 3.2 oz fell approx 50' from AFT PRS.					

PROGRESS:

Stabilize well; drilled to TD 18,360' MD; Test BOPs; Wireline logging well.



	AFE# (X2-000X8)		**Latest Field Estimate**		**AFE Variance** Over / (Under)	
	Time (Rig Days)	**Cost** ($MM gross)	**Time** (Rig Days)	**Cost** ($MM gross)	**Time** (Rig Days)	**Cost** ($MM gross)
Well to Date	113.0	$114.1	110.2	$105.2	(2.8)	(8.9)
Total	167	$151.0				
Comments	Actual does not include 44.1 suspended days; approximate $30.9MM, due to Hurricane Ida & Rig change. Supplemental AFEs 1st for 27.9 and 2nd for 27.0 ($151 total)					

FORWARD PLAN (week ahead):

Continue to WL log. Make cleanout trip, Run & cement 9-7/8 x 7" Prod. Csg, Set WB, Set cement plug, Set Lock down sleeve (LDS). Clean and Pull Riser.

Major Risks: Hole stability during cleanout, Unable to land Csg in WH, Cmt zonal Isolation, LDS won't set.

From: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 5:07 PM
To: Guide, John; Hafle, Mark E; Morel, Brian P; Cocales, Brett W; Sepulvado, Ronald W; Sepulvado, Murry R
Cc: Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: Fw: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested
Note BOP test extension and cement top on IADC per David's note below.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory Specialist
BP America

"CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain information that is confidential. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete the E-mail and any attachments from your computer and files. Thank you."

From: Trocquet, David <David.Trocquet@mms.gov>
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Cc: Patton, Frank <Frank.Patton@mms.gov>; Guide, John; Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Sent: Wed Mar 10 22:58:40 2010
Subject: RE: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested

Scherie,

After further consideration, an extension is approved to delay the BOP test until the lower cement plug is set. Before testing BOP's, please wait for the cement plug to set up and verify its successful placement by tagging with 15000# pipe weight. Please note the depth of the cement top and BOP test extension in the IADC report (because of well control operations).

Thanks,
David Trocquet

From: Douglas, Scherie D [mailto:Scherie.Douglas@bp.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 3:41 PM
To: Trocquet, David
Cc: Patton, Frank; Guide, John; Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: FW: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested

Dave,

John Guide and I would like to have a conversation with you in the morning to discuss the BOP test. We have major concerns about coming out without getting at least one cement plug set to secure the well.

I realize the guidance on BOP test extensions comes from the region office, but we wanted to discuss with you first. What is a convenient time for you tomorrow (between 8-10 in the morning would be great if possible)?

Thanks for your help.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
281.366.6843 (office)
713.702.7673 (cell)

From: Patton, Frank [mailto:Frank.Patton@mms.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 3:23 PM
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Cc: Trocquet, David; Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: RE: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested

Scherie,

Sorry, we cannot grant a departure on the BOP test further than when you get the well under control. It is OK to not place a cement plug across the 4 foot stringer since you can't.

Thanks,

Frank Patton
District Drilling Engineer
MMS New Orleans District
(504) 734-6748

From: Douglas, Scherie D [mailto:Scherie.Douglas@bp.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 1:57 PM
To: Patton, Frank
Cc: Trocquet, David; Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: RE: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested

Frank,

We have a partial log over the area below 12,900' that has a 4' stringer that shows some resistivity which has bridged over. We are packed off and unable to circulate through the bit or under reamer, indicating we are packed off above the under reamer. There is no way for us to perforate to put cement across that stringer.

With the give and take of the well and hole behavior we would feel much more comfortable getting at least one of the two plugs set in order to fully secure the well prior to testing BOPs.

Please let me know if you have further questions or comments. Thanks.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
281.366.6843 (office)
713.702.7673 (cell)

From: Patton, Frank [mailto:Frank.Patton@mms.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 12:12 PM
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Subject: RE: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested

Scherie,

Are there any hydrocarbon bearing zones below 12,900 feet?

Thanks,

Frank Patton
District Drilling Engineer
MMS New Orleans District
(504) 734-6748

From: Douglas, Scherie D [mailto:Scherie.Douglas@bp.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 11:11 AM
To: Patton, Frank
Cc: Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested
Importance: High

Frank,

We are in the midst of a well control situation on MC 252 #001 and have stuck pipe. We are bringing out equipment to begin operations to sever the drillpipe, plugback the well and bypass.

The APM for the plugback is submitted in Ewell.

The BOP test is due tomorrow. We would like to set the plugs (2) after we kill the well and then test BOPs per the procedure in the APM. Please advise if this is acceptable.

Please let me know if you have any questions or require additional information. Thanks.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
281.366.6843 (office)
713.702.7673 (cell)

From: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 9:01 AM
To: Morel, Brian P; Cocales, Brett W; Guide, John
Cc: Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: Fw: Test Pressure
Please send to the rig as I am in training today.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory Specialist
BP America

From: Patton, Frank <Frank.Patton@mms.gov>
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Mon Feb 08 14:58:51 2010
Subject: RE: Test Pressure

Scherie,

Yes the testing of the annulars to 3500 was approved. Are the Texans next to win (after the Saints win a few more)?

Frank Patton
District Drilling Engineer
MMS New Orleans District
(504) 734-6748

From: Douglas, Scherie D [mailto:Scherie.Douglas@bp.com]
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 8:56 AM
To: Patton, Frank
Cc: Douglas, Scherie D
Subject: Fw: Test Pressure

Frank,
I'm pretty sure you understood and approved the intent to test the annulars to 3500 psi when we get back in the well. The narrative in the RPD states that but I failed to change it in the 18" section of the casing details and we have not run 16" yet. .

Please advise if there is.a problem with testing to 3500 for all annular tests. Thanks.

How about them saints!!!

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory Specialist
BP America

From: Morel, Brian P
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Mon Feb 08 14:45:10 2010
Subject: RE: Test Pressure

Yes it says it in the narrative, but on the interval section it reads 5000.





From: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 8:42 AM
To: Morel, Brian P
Subject: Re: Test Pressure

That is what is in the revised permit - right? I am in training and don't have it with me but that is what we asked for and got approved I'm pretty sure.

I will call you at a break.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory Specialist
BP America

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From: Morel, Brian P
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Mon Feb 08 14:36:56 2010
Subject: Test Pressure

Scherie,
I think this is just a technicality, but wanted to make sure it doesn't get us into trouble. We will be testing the annulars to 3500 psi, but for the 3rd interval it says 5000 psi (18" already set). Can you confirm that we are alright to test for the remainder of the well 3500 psi on both annulars?

Thank You,
Brian Morel

<<RPD-Annual Pressure approval.pdf>>

From: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2010 6:57 AM
To: Hafle, Mark E; Guide, John; Cocales, Brett W; Morel, Brian P; Sepulvado, Murry R; Sepulvado, Ronald W
Cc: stephen.dessauer2@mms.gov; Patton, Frank; Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: MC 252 #001 - Verbal Approval
Verbal approval granted at 11:00 p.m. last night to revise the setting depth of the cement plug to 12,150' due to the SCMT/Temp logging tool left in the hole.

Note on IADC.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
281.366.6843 (office)
713.702.7673 (cell)

Duncan, Jeff

From:	Green, Earley
Sent:	Sunday, May 30, 2010 4:18 PM
To:	Green, Earley
Cc:	E&C Dem All Staffs; Cavicke, David; Golding, Garrett; Kohl, Kevin; Mertens Campbell, Amanda; Walker, Linda; Wheelbarger, Katie
Subject:	Documents Concerning Issues Raised in Recent News Media Accounts Related to the Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill
Attachments:	Memo.BP.Investigation.Media.Accounts.5.30.10.doc; BP-HZN-CEC018375.pdf; BP-HZN-CEC018384.pdf; BP-HZN-CEC018441.pdf; BP-HZN-CEC018442.pdf; BP-HZN-CEC008333.pdf; BP-HZN-CEC009099.pdf
Categories:	Yellow Category

Please forward this notice to the appropriate staff in your office:

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Attached is a memo from Chairmen Henry A. Waxman and Bart Stupak regarding *The New York Times* article published yesterday, entitled "Documents Show Earlier Fears About Safety of Offshore Well." Also attached are documents that were cited in The New York Times article.

If you have questions, please contact David Leviss or Meredith Fuchs with the Committee staff at 6-2424.

From: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 9:01 AM
To: Morel, Brian P; Cocales, Brett W; Guide, John
Cc: Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: Fw: Test Pressure
Please send to the rig as I am in training today.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory Specialist
BP America

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From: Patton, Frank [redacted]
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Mon Feb 08 14:58:51 2010
Subject: RE: Test Pressure

Scherie,

Yes the testing of the annulars to 3500 was approved. Are the Texans next to win (after the Saints win a few more)?

Frank Patton
District Drilling Engineer
MMS New Orleans District
[redacted]

From: Douglas, Scherie D [redacted]
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 8:56 AM
To: Patton, Frank
Cc: Douglas, Scherie D
Subject: Fw: Test Pressure

Frank,
I'm pretty sure you understood and approved the intent to test the annulars to 3500 psi when we get back in the well. The narrative in the RPD states that but I failed to change it in the 18" section of the casing details and we have not run 16" yet.

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BP America

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Sent: Mon Feb 08 14:45:10 2010
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



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Sr. Regulatory Specialist
BP America

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Thank You,
Brian Morel

From: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2009 9:50 AM
To: Labiche, Lance
Cc: Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting); Gray, George E
Subject: RE: Hurricane Rig Damage question
Lance,

Thanks - we will put in next week's WAR.

We were already shut down before Ida for BOP repairs, and we will remain shut down until these repairs are complete. Not sure about the timing yet but Transocean's assessment team will be at the rig today and we will know more about what the repairs will encompass after that.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
[redacted] *(office)*
[redacted] *(cell)*

From: Labiche, Lance [redacted]@mms.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2009 9:29 AM
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Subject: Re: Hurricane Rig Damage question

Scherie,

You can take care of that with mentioning it in the WAR. Any estimate on how long repairs will take? Are well operations shutdown until the repairs are made?

Thanks
Lance

Sent from blackberry

From: Douglas, Scherie D[redacted]
To: Labiche, Lance
Sent: Tue Nov 17 07:14:37 2009
Subject: Hurricane Rig Damage question

Lance,

We were troubleshooting an electrical short on the Marianas (anchor winch 3 & 4) over the weekend. We had to get scaffolding erected to get under the main deck where we discovered electrical wiring damage incurred during Ida. Transocean has a team going to the rig to assess the extent of the damage and what repairs will look like.

My question is - do you want that in a hurricane rig damage report? Or should I just report it in the Weekly Activity Report?

Thanks.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
[redacted] *(office)*
[redacted] *(cell)*

Appendix F:
Application for Revised New Well (APD)

U.S. Department of the Interior
Minerals Management Service (MMS)

OMB Control Number 1010-0141
OMB Approval Expires 08/31/2008

Form MMS 123A/123S - Electronic Version

Application for Revised New Well

Lease G32306 **Area/Block** MC 252 **Well Name** 001 **ST** 00 **BP** 00 **Well Type** Exploration
Application Status Approved **Operator** 02481 BP Exploration & Production Inc.

Correction Narrative 01-25-10 -

1) Revise Annular Pressure test from 5000 psi to 3500 psi.

2) Request departure to stump test the 6-5/8" and 5-1/2" drill pipe but only the 6-5/8" drillpipe subsea. The only time the 5-1/2" will be run below the stack is as an inner string during the 16" casing job. Once the 16" string is landed out and cemented, the seal assemble will be set, and the inner string pulled out of the wellbore. During this time the 5-1/2" will be below the stack inside the casing

---

01-12-10 - Revision to use the Deepwater Horizon to finish drilling operations (Marianas sent to shipyard for repairs, no longer under BP contract).

Revised attachments include:
1) Horizon BOP schematic
2) Wellbore schematic with revised RKB
3) Revised Departure List (removed departure for 250.449 (f)
4) Revised Pore Pressure Plot with Horizon RKB

The casing information has been upated to reflect actual setting depths, mudweights, etc.

Attachments referring to the Marianas BOPs and mooring have been removed.

10-29-09 - Revised to show shallow setting depth and revised cement volume for the 18" casing.

Revision I: 10-15-09
This RPD is to request approval to replace the upper annular element from the originally approved standard element rated to 10k on 5-1/2" pipe to a 6-5/8" element which is rated to 7.5k on 5-1/2" and 10k on 6-5/8".

Please see the attached chart which shows the rating of each element. Our max annular tests per the approved APD will be 5k both on the stump test and down hole

From: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 5:07 PM
To: Guide, John; Hafle, Mark E; Morel, Brian P; Cocales, Brett W; Sepulvado, Ronald W; Sepulvado, Murry R
Cc: Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: Fw: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested
Note BOP test extension and cement top on IADC per David's note below.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory Specialist
BP America

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From: Trocquet, David [redacted]@mms.gov>
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Cc: Patton, Frank [redacted]; Guide, John; Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Sent: Wed Mar 10 22:58:40 2010
Subject: RE: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested

Scherie,

After further consideration, an extension is approved to delay the BOP test until the lower cement plug is set. Before testing BOP's, please wait for the cement plug to set up and verify its successful placement by tagging with 15000# pipe weight. Please note the depth of the cement top and BOP test extension in the IADC report (because of well control operations).

Thanks,
David Trocquet

From: Douglas, Scherie D [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 3:41 PM
To: Trocquet, David
Cc: Patton, Frank; Guide, John; Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: FW: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested

Dave,

John Guide and I would like to have a conversation with you in the morning to discuss the BOP test. We have major concerns about coming out without getting at least one cement plug set to secure the well.

I realize the guidance on BOP test extensions comes from the region office, but we wanted to discuss with you first. What is a convenient time for you tomorrow (between 8-10 in the morning would be great if possible)?

Thanks for your help.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
[redacted] *(office)*
[redacted] *(cell)*

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From: Patton, Frank [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 3:23 PM
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Cc: Trocquet, David; Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: RE: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested

Scherie,

Sorry, we cannot grant a departure on the BOP test further than when you get the well under control. It is OK to not place a cement plug across the 4 foot stringer since you can't.

Thanks,

Frank Patton
District Drilling Engineer
MMS New Orleans District
[redacted]

From: Douglas, Scherie D [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 1:57 PM
To: Patton, Frank
Cc: Trocquet, David; Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: RE: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested

Frank,

We have a partial log over the area below 12,900' that has a 4' stringer that shows some resistivity which has bridged over. We are packed off and unable to circulate through the bit or under reamer, indicating we are packed off above the under reamer. There is no way for us to perforate to put cement across that stringer.

With the give and take of the well and hole behavior we would feel much more comfortable getting at least one of the two plugs set in order to fully secure the well prior to testing BOPs.

Please let me know if you have further questions or comments. Thanks.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
[redacted] *(office)*
[redacted] *(cell)*

From: Patton, Frank [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 12:12 PM
To: Douglas, Scherie D
Subject: RE: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested

Scherie,

Are there any hydrocarbon bearing zones below 12,900 feet?

Thanks,

Frank Patton
District Drilling Engineer
MMS New Orleans District
[redacted]

From: Douglas, Scherie D [redacted]
Sent: Wednesday, March 10, 2010 11:11 AM
To: Patton, Frank
Cc: Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: MC 252 #001 - Plugback approval requested
Importance: High

Frank,

We are in the midst of a well control situation on MC 252 #001 and have stuck pipe. We are bringing out equipment to begin operations to sever the drillpipe, plugback the well and bypass.

The APM for the plugback is submitted in Ewell.

The BOP test is due tomorrow. We would like to set the plugs (2) after we kill the well and then test BOPs per the procedure in the APM. Please advise if this is acceptable.

Please let me know if you have any questions or require additional information. Thanks.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
[redacted] *(office)*
[redacted] *(cell)*

From: Douglas, Scherie D
Sent: Friday, March 12, 2010 6:57 AM
To: Hafle, Mark E; Guide, John; Cocales, Brett W; Morel, Brian P; Sepulvado, Murry R; Sepulvado, Ronald W
Cc: [redacted]dessauer[redacted]mms.gov; Patton, Frank; Powell, Heather (JC Connor Consulting)
Subject: MC 252 #001 - Verbal Approval
Verbal approval granted at 11:00 p.m. last night to revise the setting depth of the cement plug to 12,150' due to the SCMT/Temp logging tool left in the hole.

Note on IADC.

Scherie Douglas
Sr. Regulatory & Advocacy Advisor
BP Exploration & Production Inc.
[redacted]*(office)*
[redacted]*(cell)*

Evaluation of Casing Design Basis for

Macondo Prospect

Mississippi Canyon Block 252

OCS-G-32306 Well No.1

Revision 2

14 May 2009

[redacted]
EPT Drilling

EPT

Casing Summary

Macondo Prospect: Based on the detailed analysis the following tubulars are recommended:

Casing weights and grades were selected by; 1) the minimum required to meet the design requirements, and/or 2) standardized combinations for ease of procurement and minimization of BP OCTG stock, and/or 3) the standard tubulars for DW GOM wells. To use up BP stock other connections from the BP Approved Connection List for the are acceptable. The SF_A could change with a change in connection, but nothing significant is anticipated. Based on the above tubular recommendations, a dispensation from the BP Drilling and Well Operations Policy is required for the 22" Surface casing, 16" Intermediate casing, 12.140" Drilling liner, and 9-7/8" Production casing.

Revision 1 changes the 16" from 109.00 ppf and a full string to 96.00 ppf and a liner with the TOL in the 22" 1.500" wall X80 surface casing. Also the 11-7/8" drilling liner is changed to a 13.625" SET.

Revision 2 changes the setting depth of the 22", 18", 16", 13-5/8" and 11-7/8". PTD is changed to 20200 ft and the PP and FG were revised slightly.

This is a sub-sea well designed for production. Evaluation for the mitigation for APB (Annular Pressure Build-up), for the drilling case, is recommended.

Introduction

The casing pressure test (PT) loads were selected to provide results at or near the worst case burst load and have not been checked for compliance with any government requirements. The final design factors do not include any allowance for casing wear.

Figure 2: Macondo Prospect MC252Proposed Casing R2

Duncan, Jeff

From: Goo, Michael
Sent: Monday, May 31, 2010 12:42 PM
To: 'Reicherts, Elizabeth A'; 'Jim Massie'
Subject: Letter to Lamar McKay re video feed--number 3.
Attachments: Scan001.PDF

Categories: Yellow Category

Guys--please find attached a letter from Chairman Markey. Call me with questions. Thanks.

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

2125 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515–6115

MAJORITY (202) 225–2927
FACSIMILE (202) 225–2525
MINORITY (202) 225–3641

energycommerce.house.gov

May 31, 2010

Mr. Lamar McKay
President and CEO
BP America, Inc.
510 Westlake Park Boulevard
Houston, Texas 70779

Dear Mr. McKay:

Last week, on May 24, I wrote a letter to you regarding the need for BP to maintain complete transparency regarding its operations to stop the flow of oil at the Deepwater Horizon accident site, 5000 feet beneath the surface of the Gulf of Mexico. As I noted in that letter, BP is capturing live footage from multiple cameras at the accident site and in order to get a clear picture of the true situation, the American public and the news media needs to be able to see all cameras operating in real time, in the same way that BP executives and engineers, and others involved in accident operations, are able to see such operations. There is no excuse for not providing us this basic information.

The need for such information was apparent during the recent "top kill" operation, when BP suspended pumping of mud at certain points of the project, attempted to use "bridging material" as part of a "junk shot" and made numerous other tactical decisions during the process, without providing clarity to the public and news media at the time such decisions were happening. That is unacceptable, given the very high stakes involved in this disaster and the right we all have to know whether your actions are proceeding according to plan and as projected. There cannot be any delay or gaps in our understanding of this situation, given that thousands of barrels of oil are spewing forth each day into the gulf, with catastrophic long-term consequences.

Therefore, I am reiterating my request that, from now on, all cameras be made available in live streaming feed to the public and news media. In this regard, I note that

the view of the feed does not always seem to include all cameras, since at times camera shots appear on the single live feed that is publicly available, but do not also appear on the multi-camera view screen you have provided to me. BP should not be controlling the view the American public has of this disaster in our ocean.

Yesterday, BP Executive Bob Dudley suggested that the severing of the broken marine riser from the blowout preventer would likely not change "significantly" the rate of oil flowing from the well. However, government representatives, including Assistant to the President, Carol M. Browner, have suggested that severing of the riser pipe could increase the flow by up to 20%. As I have communicated to you repeatedly, getting an accurate estimate of the flow rate is essential in ensuring an appropriate spill response—therefore it is equally essential that video data be available to us all, including the flow rate technical group and other outside experts, for full evaluation of the true situation. All parties need to see for themselves in real time the effects of the severing of the pipe and to be able to continue to monitor that situation throughout the crisis.

I want to continue to make clear that in seeking such live video feed, I do not want to compromise operations or affect the integrity of the video feed. However, I believe that the streaming that you have provided to date has demonstrated that you are able to provide such feeds without any such effects.

Finally, I am reiterating my request that all video be time-stamped and dated, available in easy to access, multiple formats and that it all be archived, with the archived footage being provided to me as soon as possible. It was my understanding from your staff that such archived footage would be provided to me immediately after the "top kill" operation. I have not received any such footage. As we continue to investigate all aspects of BP's response to this crisis, in the days and weeks ahead, access to this information will be critical to ensuring that we have nothing less than the complete picture.

I would appreciate your prompt response to this letter.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Markey
Chairman
Subcommittee on Energy and
Environment

Cc: Chairman Henry Waxman

Ranking Member Joe Barton

Ranking Member Fred Upton

Duncan, Jeff

From: Goo, Michael
Sent: Monday, May 31, 2010 1:18 PM
To: 'Reicherts, Elizabeth A'; 'Jim Massie'
Subject: Another letter on plumes underwater.
Attachments: Scan001.pdf

Categories: Yellow Category

May 31, 2010

Mr. Lamar McKay
President and CEO
BP America, Inc.
510 Westlake Park Boulevard
Houston, Texas 70779

Dear Mr. McKay:

I write to request information regarding statements that BP CEO Tony Hayward reportedly made yesterday, in which he asserted that all oil being spewed from the gushing Deepwater Horizon well is on the surface of the ocean, and not dispersed in vast, undersea plumes as some independent scientists have found.

As you know, several scientists have independently found large volumes of oil under the surface of water, and some have speculated that these may have been formed as a result of the use of dispersants sub-surface. For example, the University of South Florida College of Marine Science recently reported that it found a 22 mile long undersea plume of dispersed oil at a location that raised concern about its proximity to the food chain for sea life in the waters of Florida. Other researchers have found similar evidence of such plumes.

However, according to media reports, Mr. Hayward stated yesterday that BP's samples showed "no evidence" that oil was suspended sub-surface in this manner, going on to state that:

"The oil is on the surface. Oil has a specific gravity that's about half that of water. It wants to get to the surface because of the difference in specific gravity."

The confirmation of the presence of large quantities of oil sub-surface could help to inform clean-up and response efforts, and it is vital that there is unfettered access to all relevant data or analysis. Consequently, I ask that you provide me with the following:

1) Copies of all measurements, calculations or other supporting materials on which Mr. Hayward based his statements regarding the existence of sub-surface plumes of oil (including indications of BP' s methodology or any observational equipment used).

2) Any additional information on which Mr. Hayward based his statements.

Please provide these materials to me no later than close of business on Friday June 4, 2010. If you have any questions or concerns, or to arrange for delivery of the requested materials, please have your staff contact Dr. Michal Freedhoff of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee staff at 202-225-2836.

Sincerely,

Edward J. Markey

Chairman

Subcommittee on Energy and Environment

Cc: Chairman Henry Waxman
Ranking Member Joe Barton
Ranking Member Fred Upton

Duncan, Jeff

From: Reicherts, Elizabeth A [Liz.Reicherts@bp.com]
Sent: Monday, May 31, 2010 4:27 PM
To: Goo, Michael; Jim Massie
Subject: RE: Another letter on plumes underwater.

Categories: Red Category

Ok - got them both.

Liz Reicherts
Sr. Director, US Government & International Affairs BP America Inc.
1101 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005
202.457.6585 direct
202.669.9892 cell

-----Original Message-----
From: Goo, Michael [mailto:Michael.Goo@mail.house.gov]
Sent: Monday, May 31, 2010 1:18 PM
To: Reicherts, Elizabeth A; Jim Massie
Subject: Another letter on plumes underwater.

May 31, 2010

Mr. Lamar McKay
President and CEO
BP America, Inc.
510 Westlake Park Boulevard
Houston, Texas 70779

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Sincerely,

Edward J. Markey

Chairman
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment

Cc: Chairman Henry Waxman
Ranking Member Joe Barton
Ranking Member Fred Upton

Duncan, Jeff

From: Gray, Morgan
Sent: Wednesday, June 02, 2010 10:28 AM
To: Goo, Michael
Subject: FW: BP OSRP part 1

Categories: Red Category

From: Golden, Ali
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2010 3:20 PM
To: Gray, Morgan
Subject: BP OSRP part 1

BP OSRP part 1.pdf

Alexandra Golden
Professional Staff
House Energy and Commerce Committee
316 Ford House Office Building
202.226.4927 (p)
202.225.5288 (f)

OSRP QUICK GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS

BP OSRP QUICK GUIDE

The BP OSRP Quick Guide is a concise set of easy–to–follow instructions and related information regarding actions to be performed by the person in charge, as well as other on duty personnel, in the event of a release of product in the region covered by the plan. Additional information and detail may be found in the corresponding sections and appendices of the Oil Spill Response Plan itself.

A. Safety

I. Introduction

Site Safety Planning is an essential element of emergency preparedness and response. BP is dedicated to ensuring the safety of company personnel and the public. In the event of an oil spill, or other emergency, BP will manage a coordinated response to minimize impacts to the environment while keeping safety issues in the forefront. The Site Safety Plan (with the ICS Forms at the end of this section) is a general plan intended to address initial safety criteria during the early stages of the response effort.

II. Roles and Responsibilities

*A list of responsibilities of response personnel in the Command Section, and other ICS positions, is detailed in **Section 4** of the OSRP.*

B. Spill Assessment

Upon receiving indication of an oil spill, or other chemical release that may threaten the Waters of the United States, the following actions are critical to initiating and sustaining an effective response:

•	Locate the spill
•	Determine size and volume of the spill
•	Predict spill movement
•	Monitor and track spill movement

Specific directions and strategies for performing the above actions are detailed in **Section 10** of the OSRP. Additionally, **Figure 1-1a** and **Figure 1-1b** provide information related to spill estimation and trajectory requests respectively. **Figures 1-25 – 1-28** are a list of facilities covered by this quick guide and the associated oil spill response plan. *For detailed information regarding spill assessment, see **Section 10** of the OSRP.*

•	Initiate surveillance overflights of spill area at first light or as soon as possible with fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft to determine: a) Size and description of oil slick b) Direction of movement c) Coordinates of leading and trailing edge of oil slick d) Sensitivities endangered e) Population areas threatened
•	Video and photograph spill area daily during surveillance over flights for documentation and operational purposes, dependent upon weather conditions.
•	Activate the BP Incident Management Team (SMT) along with the Unified Command ICS dependent upon the severity of the emergency event.
•	Notify MSRC and other OSRO'S to respond to the emergency dependent upon spill response requirements.
•	Obligate all funds required to maintain the coordinated and integrated response activities that are required and/or directed.
•	Conduct tactical and planning meetings at predetermined time periods along with incident briefings and special purpose meeting which may include: a) Unified Command Meetings b) Command Staff Meetings c) Business Management Meetings d) Agency Representative Meetings e) Press Conferences

C. Locating a Spill

In the event of a significant release of oil, an accurate estimation of the spill's total volume along with the spill location and movement is essential in providing preliminary data to plan and initiate cleanup operations. Generating the estimation as soon as possible will aid in determining:

•	Equipment and personnel required;
•	Potential threat to shorelines and/or sensitive areas as well as ecological impact; and
•	Requirements for storage and disposal of recovered materials.

As part of the initial response, BP will initiate a systematic search with aircraft, primarily helicopters, to locate a spill and determine the coordinates of the release. In the event weather prohibits use of aircraft, (both fixed wing and rotor) field boats may be utilized to conduct search operations.

Aircraft will also be utilized to photograph the spill on a daily basis, or more frequently if required, for operational purposes. The overflight information will assist with estimating the spill size and movement based upon existing reference points (i.e., oil rigs, islands, familiar shoreline features, etc.).

D. Determining the Size and Volume of a Spill

When a spill has been verified and located, the priority issue will be to estimate and report the volume and measurements of the spill as soon as possible. Spill measurements will primarily be estimated by using coordinates, pictures, drawings, and other information received from helicopter or fixed wing overflights.

Oil spill volume estimations may be determined by direct measurements or by calculations based upon visual assessment of the color of the slick and information related to length and width that can be calculated on existing charts. The appearance of oil on water varies with the oil's type and thickness as well as ambient light conditions. Oil slick thicknesses greater than approximately 0.25 mm cannot be determined by appearance alone.

Direct measurements are the preferred method for determining the volume of a spill. Measurements can be obtained by:

•	Gauging the tank or container to determine volume lost
•	Measuring pressure lost over time
•	Determining the pump or spill rate (GPM) and elapsed time

Visual assessment for determining the volume of oil based on slick information begins with understanding the terminology listed below:

•	Sheen – oil visible on the water as a silvery sheen or with tints of rainbow colors. This is the smallest thickness of oil.
•	Dark colors – visible with dark colors (i.e., yellowish brown, light brown) with a trace of rainbow color but is not black or dark brown.
•	Black/Dark Brown – fresh oil after initial spreading will have a black or very dark brown color. This is the largest thickness of non emulsified oil.
•	Mousse – water-in-oil emulsion which is often orange to rust colored. It is thick and viscous and may contain 30% oil.

Several natural weathering processes occur which diminish the severity of the spill depending upon the composition of the oil. Natural weathering processes include the following:

•	Dispersion
•	Dissolution
•	Emulsification
•	Evaporation

Factors listed in **Figure 1-1a and Figure 1-1b** will be used to estimate the volume of oil in a spill unless an accurate amount is known by other means. Estimated spill volumes should be rounded off to avoid the misconception of a precise determination.

E. Predicting Spill Movement

Real time oil spill trajectory models predict the movement of spilled oil on water as well as identifying potential shoreline impact areas and other environmentally and ecologically sensitive areas.

The Response Group in Houston, TX, is the primary resource providing BP with predictions of both the movement of oil on water and potential impact areas. The Response Group is available on a 24 hour/day basis at (281) 880-5000 (Office) or (713) 906-9866 (Cellular). The Response Group relies on a number of sources that provide real time data in conjunction with condition variables in order to track and predict spill movement throughout the duration of an incident. Trajectory model results will be transferred to BP personnel via fax or by modem directly into BP's computer system. Weather forecasts, buoy data, and National Weather Bureau satellite imagery may be collected from internet services or by contacting the National Weather Service as listed below:

•	Gulf of Mexico website: http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/marine/zone/gulf/gulfmz.htm Slidell, LA (504) 589-2808
•	Houston/Galveston, TX Area (281) 337-5074
•	Brownsville, TX (956) 504-1432 Austin/San Antonio, TX (830) 606-3617
•	Miami, FL (305) 229-4550

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is another available resource that can provide oil trajectories. GNOME (General NOAA Operational Modeling Environment) is the oil spill trajectory model used by OR&R Emergency Response Division (ERD) responders during an oil spill. ERD trajectory modelers use GNOME in Diagnostic Mode to set up custom scenarios quickly. In Standard Mode, anyone can use GNOME (with a Location File) to:

- Predict how wind, currents, and other processes might move and spread oil spilled on the water.
- Learn how predicted oil trajectories are affected by inexactness ("uncertainty") in current and wind observations and forecasts.
- See how spilled oil is predicted to change chemically and physically ("weather") during the time that it remains on the water surface.

For more information, contact Charlie Henry, the NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator for Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and the Florida Panhandle at (504) 589-4414.

Trajectory models can be run with predicted weather information used as input over a several hour period. The Response Group offers the following services from the office and remote locations:

- ✓ Oilmap Trajectory Modeling program
- ✓ General NOAA Oil Modeling Environment
- ✓ Scripps/MMS Oceanographic Data
- ✓ Scripps SEA Current Information
- ✓ MMS Buoy Information
- ✓ NOAA Ship Drift Information
- ✓ Overflight GPS Positioning Data
- ✓ ETA's to Shoreline
- ✓ Offshore Response Plans
- ✓ Biological Resources in the path of the slick

BP personnel can initiate the trajectory mapping process by calling or submitting a trajectory request form, **Figure 1-3**, as soon as the following information is available:

- wind speed & direction
- current speed & direction
- sea state
- spill volume
- continuous or instantaneous release
- type of oil (API gravity)
- latitude & longitude (spill site)
- duration of spill
- direction of spill movement
- date & time of incident
- air & water temperature
- source of spill
- high tide & low tide

Trajectory model results may be updated periodically depending upon revised surveillance information and the latest weather updates.

F. Monitoring and Tracking the Spill Movement

Surveillance of the spill movement throughout the incident is essential to bringing response operations to a successful conclusion. BP will maintain the over flight and trajectory modeling programs to monitor and predict the movement of oil until spill response operations are completed.

Surveillance operations can be continued both day and night, and in inclement weather, through the use of infrared sensing cameras capable of detecting oil on water. Information from the infrared cameras can be downloaded to a computer and printed out on a chart and/or recorded on videotape.

Oil Thickness Estimations				
Standard Term	Approx. Film Thickness		Approx. Quantity of Oil in Film	
	Inches	Mm		
Barely Visible	0.0000015	0.00004	25 gals/mile²	44 liters/km²
Silvery	0.000003	0.00008	50 gals/mile²	88 liters/km²
Slight Color	0.000006	0.00015	100 gals/mile²	176 liters/km²
Bright Color	0.000012	0.0003	200 gals/mile²	351 liters/km²
Dull	0.00004	0.001	666 gals/mile²	1,168 liters/km²
Dark	0.00008	0.002	1,332 gals/mile²	2,237 liters/km²
Thickness of light oils: 0.0010 inches to 0.00010 inches. Thickness of heavy oils: 0.10 inches to 0.010 inches.				

Spill Volume Estimation Procedure	
1.	Estimate dimensions (length x width) of the spill in miles. Multiply length times width to calculate area covered by oil in square miles
2.	Multiply each area calculated in (1) by the appropriate factor from the thickness estimation table (above) and add the parts together

Oil Coverage Estimation Chart — Figure 1-1a

**



From Office of Response & Restriction, National Ocean Service, National Ocean & Atmospheric Administration

Oil Volume Estimation Chart — Figure 1-1b

1. To establish the area affected by pollution.
- Determine spill size (use aircraft if possible).
- Draw an imaginary box around the oil.
- Measure the length and width of the box (5,280 feet = 1 mile).
- Multiply the length x width = (a) m^2



2.) Extent of Oil Coverage
- Envision the oil pushed together into one part of the box.
- Estimate % of box containing oil = (b) % coverage.



3.) Multiply estimated area (a) x estimated coverage (b) = (c) total m^2

____mi^2 x ____% coverage = ___ total mi^2
(a) (b) (c)

4.) Appearance of Oil:
- Estimate the percent of the oil matching each color under appearance. Enter that number in the percentage blank (e.g. 50% dull, 30% brightly colored, 20% slightly colored).
- Enter total mi^2 (Item c).
- Multiply % appearance x gal/mi^2 x mi^2 for each appearance.
- Enter sum for total gallons.

ESTIMATION TABLE

Appearance	%	x	Gal/ mi^2	x	mi^2 (c)	=	Gal.
Barely Visible		X	25	X		=	
Silvery		X	50	X		=	
Slightly Colored		X	100	X		=	
Brightly Colored		X	200	X		=	
Dull		X	666	X		=	
Dark		X	1332	x		=	
Total Gallons							

5). Final Calculation (divide gallons by 42):

____Total gal/42 = ____bbls

BP Spill Reporting Form

Figure 1-2

PLEASE FILL OUT HIGHLIGHTED FIELDS IMMEDIATELY AND REPORT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL PAGER (713)-612-4106

Date/Time of Spill: _____ Date of Report: _____

Date/Time Spill was Discovered: _____ Time of Report: _____

Sighted By: _____ Reported By: _____

Facility (Lat/Long) Location: _____ County/Parish: _____ State: _____

Area/Block: _____ OCS-G _____ Well #: _____

Description of incident: _____

Spill Source: _____

Type of material released: _____

Quantity Discharged: _____ Discharge Rate: _____

Description of spill: (i.e., slick – colored film or layer of oil, sheen – thin clear film or thin layer of oil; rainbow – reflect on type film, size):

_____

Length of Time Discharge Occurred: _____ Quantity: _____ Recovered: _____

Weather: Clear _____ Cloudy _____ Fog _____ Rain _____

Wind: Velocity _____ Dir. (from) _____ Current Dir. (to) _____ Velocity _____

Visibility: _____ Ceiling: _____

Temperature: _____ Wave: Height _____

Did spill affect any water? _____ If yes, describe and name: _____

Size of Oil: Width _____ Length _____

Percent Coverage: _____

Approximate Location of Oil: Lat. _____ Long. _____

Direction of Movement: _____

Potential Hazard to Life and Property: _____

Description of effects of spill (on fish, wildlife, vegetation, etc.): _____

Damage: _____ Injuries: _____

Corrective Action Taken: _____

Cause: _____

Explain containment and cleanup measures taken (including equipment and material used): _____

How successful were these efforts (amount recovered): _____

Did representative of outside agency visit the scene? _____

If so, which agencies? _____

Additional remarks and recommendations (include any pertinent comments on public relations observation):

_____

_____

Supervisor In Charge

Report To Regulatory Agencies

Agency	Report By:	Report To:	Time and Date
MMS			
NRC			
EPA			
USCG			
LSP			
LOSCO			
TGLO			
TRRC			

NRC Phone # - 1-800-424-8802

NRC Case Number (assigned by the NRC): _____

NOTES:

The Response Group Spill Trajectory Request Form — Figure 1-3

The Response Group — SPILL TRAJECTORY REQUEST FORM

THE RESPONSE GROUP	OFFICE: (281) 880-5000	24-HOUR: (800) 651-3942
FAX: (281) 880-5005	EFAX: (281) 596-6976	EMAIL: trajectory@responsegroupinc.com
ROY BARRETT	MOBILE: (713) 906-9866	HOME: (281) 213-8840
JEFF HILL	MOBILE: (832) 493-3153	HOME: (979) 865-9260

COMPANY INFORMATION

Company Name: _____

Company Contact Name: _____

Phone #: _____

Alternate # (ie: Mobile, Pager): _____

Fax #: _____

Email Address: _____

SPILL SITE INFORMATION

Source Type (Circle): Platform/Well Pipeline Vessel Facility

Source Name & Location (Name/Area/Block):

Latitude: ____° ____' ____" | Longitude: ____° ____' ____"

Date & Time of Incident (mm/dd/yy): __/__/__ __:__ (Military)

Type of Product (ie: Medium Crude): _____ | API Gravity ____

Estimated Volume of Release: _____ Barrels or Gallons

Continues Release Rate: _____ bbls/hr How Long: _____ hrs.

WEATHER CONDITIONS

Wind Direction (From the): _____ | Wind Speed: _____ MPH or Knots

Current Direction (Toward): _____ | Current Speed: _____ MPH or Knots

Air Temperature: _____° C or F | Water Temperature: _____° C or F

High Tide: _____ | Low Tide: _____

Weather Forecast:

OVERFLIGHT INFORMATION

Date & Time of Overflight (mm/dd/yy): __/__/__ __:__ (Military)

Leading Edge Location:

Latitude: ____° ____' ____" | Latitude: ____° ____' ____"

Trailing Edge Location:

Latitude: ____° ____' ____" | Latitude: ____° ____' ____"

Length: _____ Feet / Yards / Miles | Width: _____ Feet / Yards / Miles

Slick Appearance (Percent & Estimated Length & Width)

Barely Visible: ____% L x W: _____ | Silvery: ____% L x W: _____

Slight Color: ____% L x W: _____ | Bright Color: ____% L x W: _____

Dull: ____% L x W: _____ | Dark: ____% L x W: _____

THE RESPONSE GROUP 13231 CHAMPION FOREST DRIVE, SUITE 310 HOUSTON, TX 77069

Initial Response Actions/Mitigation Procedures	
Description	BP company employees, contractors, and subcontractors are responsible for maintaining a vigilant watch for oil spill discharges of any magnitude and reporting all discharges to management personnel. In the event the discharge is determined to be from a BP facility or operation, the person in charge as well as on duty field personnel will take immediate action which may include but is not limited to the following:
•	As quickly as possible, safely shut down the operation responsible for the discharge.
•	Conduct Hazard Assessment to determine the potential for fire, explosion, and hazardous/toxic vapors as well as to define Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) needed by responders.
•	Identify and evacuate exclusion zone in vicinity of spill site until completion of Hazard Assessment.
•	Initiate notification of management personnel as well as required government agencies as promptly as possible. Note: The Operations Section Chief is responsible for initial regulatory notifications.
•	The Person in Charge will assume the duties of Incident Commander until help arrives.
•	Use explosion proof equipment (i.e., air monitoring equipment) in high concentration vapor areas and monitor for flammable vapors until the response operation is completed.
•	Adopt a "Safety First" attitude throughout the duration of the emergency response, and continually ensure the safety of all personnel.
•	Notify BP operations personnel (i.e., platform operators) as well as other company operations that may be impacted by the spill incident.
•	Person discovering spill will: a) Sound alarm and notify Person in Charge immediately b) Shut off ignition points and restrict access to spill area; c) Isolate discharge source pending approval by Person in Charge.
•	The Person in Charge will initiate evacuation procedures in the event unsafe conditions persist to ensure personnel safety.
•	Sample discharged material as requested by the Incident Commander by using accepted procedures to prevent sample contamination and to protect the legal validity of the sample.

•	Initiate surveillance overflights of spill area at first light or as soon as possible with fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft to determine: a) Size and description of oil slick b) Direction of movement c) Coordinates of leading and trailing edge of oil slick d) Sensitivities endangered e) Population areas threatened
•	Video and photograph spill area daily during surveillance over flights for documentation and operational purposes, dependent upon weather conditions.
•	Activate the BP Incident Management Team (IMT) along with the Unified Command ICS dependent upon the severity of the emergency event.
•	Notify Marine Spill Response Corporation, National Response Corporation, and other OSRO'S to respond to the emergency dependent upon spill response requirements.
•	Obligate all funds required to maintain the coordinated and integrated response activities that are required and/or directed.
•	Conduct tactical and planning meetings at predetermined time periods along with incident briefings and special purpose meeting which may include: a) Unified Command Meetings b) Command Staff Meetings c) Tactics Meetings d) Planning Meetings e) Press Conferences

Notifications

Internal and external notifications are a critical part of initiating a response to an oil spill or other emergency. **Figure 1-5** and **Figure 1-6** display internal and external notification procedures for releases of less than 1 barrel greater than 1 barrel respectively. **Figure 1-4** contains flowcharts for notifications. **Figure 1-6 – Figure 1-11** details regulatory notification requirements and contact information for Federal and State Agencies. Additional notification information for Local Agencies can be found in Section 8 of the OSRP. Contact information for Oil Spill Response Organizations (OSROs) and the Spill Response Operating Team (SROT) can be found in **Section 7** of the OSRP. Finally, **Figure 1-10** is the BP Spill Reporting Form. *For detailed information regarding notifications, see **Section 7** and **Section 8** of the OSRP.*

IMT Organization Chart

Figure 1-4a



Incident Management Team Activation Procedure — Figure 1-4b



GoM PLBD – Incident Notification Flow Chart — Figure 1-4c



Production Assets (Non-D&C Related) Incident Notification — Figure 1-4d



The **Responsible Individual*** will immediately contact the BP Notification Center at 1-800-321-8692 or 1-630-961-6200 to report an emergency requiring notification of the GoM Incident Management Team.
Emergencies that could require notification of the IMT include:

- Well control incident – uncontrolled blow out
- Stability issue of facility
- Emergency requiring any evacuation of facility
- Or any other issues where the **Responsible Individual*** needs assistance

Responsible Individual* - OIM, WSL, Vessel PIC

Note: See GoM Incident Notification, Reporting, and Investigation Procedure for instructions on verbal notification timeframes, investigation team make-up, documentation, report distribution and regulatory reporting requirements.

BP Owned Facilities – D&C Incident Notification

Figure 1-4e



MODU Incident Notification

Figure 1-4f



The **Responsible Individual*** will immediately contact the BP Notification Center at 1-800-321-8692 or 1-630-961-6200 to report an emergency requiring notification of the GoM Incident Management Team
Emergencies that could require notification of the IMT include:

- Well control incident – uncontrolled blow out
- Stability issue of facility
- Emergency requiring any evacuation of facility
- Or any other issues where the **Responsible Individual*** needs assistance

Responsible Individual* - OIM, WSL, Vessel PIC

Note: See GoM Incident Notification, Reporting, and Investigation Procedure for instructions on verbal notification timeframes, investigation team make-up, documentation, report distribution and regulatory reporting requirements

Vessels – Incident Notification

Figure 1-4g



The **Responsible Individual*** will immediately contact the BP Notification Center at 1-800-321-8692 or 1-630-961-6200 to report an emergency requiring notification of the GoM Incident Management Team

Emergencies that could require notification of the IMT include:

- Well control incident – uncontrolled blow out
- Stability issue of facility
- Emergency requiring any evacuation of facility
- Or any other issues where the **Responsible Individual*** needs assistance

Responsible Individual - OIM, WSL, Vessel PIC

Note: See GoM Incident Notification, Reporting, and Investigation Procedure for instructions on verbal notification timeframes, investigation team make-up, documentation, report distribution and regulatory reporting requirements

Incident Management Team and Internal Notifications — Figure 1-5

Please see the BP Quick Guide Organizational Supplement, found in the front pocket.

Federal Agency Regulatory Notifications

Figure 1-6

National Response Center	Phone Number
NRC – Hotline	**800-424-8802**

Contact NRC **immediately** if any of the following conditions occur:
- A sheen, slick, or spill is observed or discovered.
- A reportable quantity or more of a hazardous substance is released.
- A DOT gas pipeline release causes injury, death, fire, or damage of more than $50,000, including the value of lost product, and the cost of cleanup and recovery.
- A DOT oil or condensate pipeline spill exceeds 5 gallons or causes injury, death, fire, or damage of more than $50,000, including the value of lost product, and the cost of cleanup and recovery.

Verbal reports to the NRC should not e that a DOT pipeline was involved whenever applicable. A RSPA F7000-1 Form (*Accident Report – Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Systems*) should be completed and submitted to the DOT within 30 days to:

Information Resources Manager
Office of Pipeline Safety, RSPA
U. S. Dept. of Transportation – Room 2335
400 Seventh Street SW
Washington D. C. 20590

USCG SECTOR / MSU	Phone Number
Sector Corpus Christi 8930 Ocean Dr. Corpus Christi, TX 78419	(361) 939-6393 (24 hrs) (361) 939-6349 (24 hrs) (361) 939-6240 Fax
Sector Houston – Galveston 9640 Clinton Drive Houston, TX 77029	(713) 671-5100 Office (713) 671-5113 (24 hrs) (713) 671-5147 Fax
MSU Port Arthur 2901 Turtle Creek Drive Port Arthur, TX 77642	(409) 723-6500 Office (409) 719-5000 (24 hrs) (409) 723-6534 Fax
Sector New Orleans 1615 Poydras, 7th Floor New Orleans, LA 70112	(504) 846-5923 Office (504) 589-6196 (24 hrs) (504) 846-5919 Fax
MSU Morgan City 800 David Drive RM 232 Morgan City, LA 70380	(985) 380-5320 (24 hrs) (985) 385-1687 Fax

Federal Agency Regulatory Notifications (Cont'd)

Figure 1-6

USCG SECTOR / MSU (continued)	Phone Number
Sector Mobile Building 101, Brookley Complex Mobile, AL 36615	(251) 441-5720 Office (251) 441-5121 (24 hrs) (251) 441-6168 Fax
Sector Jacksonville 4200 Ocean Street Atlantic Beach, FL 32233	(904) 564-7500 Office (904) 564-7511/7512 (24 hrs) (904) 564-7519 Fax
Sector Miami 100 Macarthur Causeway Miami Beach, FL 33139	(305) 535-8700 Office (305) 535-4472/4473 (24 hrs) (305) 535-8761 Fax
MSU St. Petersburg: Prevention Department Tampa 155 Columbia Drive Tampa, FL 33606	(813) 228-2191 Office (727) 824-7506 (24 hrs) (813) 228-2050 Fax
Reporting Updates Report significant changes or new information to the appropriate USCG Marine Safety Office instead of the NRC. Include the NRC number assigned to the initial spill. Update other agencies as appropriate.	

MMS	Phone Number
New Orleans 990 North Corporate Drive, Suite 100 New Orleans, LA 70123	(504) 734-6740 Office (504) 734-6742 Office (504) 734-6741 Fax (504) 615-0114 Cell Phone
Houma 3804 Country Drive P.O. Box 760 Bourg, LA 70343-0760	(985) 853-5884 Office (985) 879-2738 Fax (985) 688-6050 Cell Phone
Lafayette 201 Energy Parkway, Suite 410 Lafayette, LA 70508	(337) 289-5100 Office (337) 354-0008 Fax (337) 280-0227 Cell Phone
Lake Charles 620 Esplanade Street, Suite 200 Lake Charles, LA 70607-2984	(337) 480-4600 Office (337) 477-9889 Fax (337) 370-2419 Cell Phone

Federal Agency Regulatory Notifications (Cont'd)

Figure 1-6

MMS	Phone Number
Lake Jackson Oak Park Center 102 Oak Park Drive, Suite 200 Clute, TX 77531	(979) 238-8121 Office (979) 238-8122 Fax (979) 292-9334 Cell Phone
Pipeline Section 1201 Elmwood Park Boulevard, MS 5232 New Orleans, LA 70123-2394	(504) 736-2814 Office (504) 736-2408 Fax (504) 452-3562 Cell Phone

Spill Reporting

You must report all spills of *1 barrel or more* to the appropriate MMS district office without delay.

For spills related to drilling or production operations:

- Fax the appropriate district office to report spills of 10 barrels or less.
- Phone the appropriate district office **immediately** to report spills in excess of 10 barrels.
- You must also immediately notify the appropriate MMS District Office and the responsible party, if known, if you observe a spill resulting from operations at another offshore facility.

Within 15 days, confirm all spills of 1 barrel or more in a written follow-up report to the appropriate MMS district office. For any spill of 1 barrel or more, your follow-up report must include the cause, location, volume, and remedial action taken. In addition, for spills of more than 50 barrels, the report must include information on the sea state, meteorological conditions, and size and appearance of the slick.

Pipeline Reporting

You must **immediately** notify the Pipeline Section of any serious accident, serious injury or fatality, fire, explosion, oil spills of *1 barrel or more* or gas leaks related to lease term or right-of-way grant pipelines. Phone the Pipeline Section **immediately** to report all pipeline spills of 1 barrel or more.

Federal Agency Regulatory Notifications (Cont'd) — Figure 1-6

Flower Garden Banks	Phone Number
Office: Galveston, Texas	(409) 621-5151 Office (409) 621-5151 x102 (George Schmahl)
George Schmahl	(979) 693-6018 Home (979) 229-6542 Cell
Marine Sanctuary Division Lisa Symons	(800) 715-3271 Pager (800) 218-1232 Pager (301) 529-1860 Cell
Spill Reporting You must report all spills from leases & ROW located near the Flower Garden Banks.	

Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety	Phone Number
Notify NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER	See Section 8, Page 3
Spill Reporting You must report any discharge from DOT Pipeline immediately.	

Federal Agency Regulatory Notifications (Cont'd)

Figure 1-6

Environmental Protection Agency	Phone Number
REGION IV Superfund/ERRB 61 Forsyth Street Atlanta, GA 30303	
Oil Spill	(404) 562-8700
NPDES Permit Violations	(404) 562-9279 (Issuances only)
REGION VI 6SF-R 1445 Ross Avenue Dallas, TX 75202	
Oil Spill	(866) EPASPILL (866) 372-7745
Alternate Number	(214) 665-6444
NPDES Permit Violations	(214) 665-7180 (Dina Granado)

Spill Reporting
Contact EPA within 24 hours if any of the following conditions occur:
- Any unanticipated bypass exceeding limitation in permit.
- Any upset condition which exceeds any effluent limitation in permit.
- Violation of maximum daily discharge limitation or daily minimum toxicity limitation.
- Chemical spills of a reportable quantity.

State Of Texas Regulatory Notifications — Figure 1-7

Agency	Phone Number
General Land Office (TGLO) Stephen F. Austin Building 1700 Congress Avenue, # 340 Austin, TX 78701	(800) 832-8224 (Emergency Hotline) (800) 998-4GLO (Toll-Free) (512) 463-5001
Railroad Commission of Texas (TRRC) Main Office 1701 North Congress P.O. Box 12967 Austin, TX 78711-2967	(877) 228-5740 (Office) (512) 463-6788 (Emergency, 24 hrs) (512) 463-7288
RRC District 2 Office 115 Travis, Suite 1610 San Antonio, TX 78205	(210) 227-1313 (24 hrs)
RRC District 3 Office 1706 Seamist Drive Ste 501 Houston, TX 77008-3135	(713) 869-5001 (24 hrs)
RRC District 4 Office 10320 IH 37 Corpus Christi, TX 78410	(361) 242-3113 (24 hrs)
Texas Parks and Wildlife	800-792-1112

TRRC/TGLO
When a sheen, slick, or spill is observed or discovered, or a chemical release occurs, call the TRC Oil & Gas Division and the Texas General Land Office's 24-hour hotline immediately.

Parks and Wildlife
When a spill impacts or has potential to impact a state wildlife management area, call the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department immediately.

Texas LEPC/Sheriff's Department	Phone Number
Aransas County	(361) 729-2222 (24 hrs)
Brazoria County	(979) 849-2441 (24 hrs)
Calhoun County	(361) 553-4646 (24 hrs)
Chambers County	(409) 267-8322 (24 hrs)
Galveston County	(409) 766-2322 (24 hrs)
Kleberg County	(361) 595-8500 (24 hrs)
Matagorda County	(979) 245-5526 (24 hrs)
Nueces County	(361) 887-2222 (24 hrs)
Willacy County	(956) 689-5576 (24 hrs)

State Of Louisiana Regulatory Notifications

Figure 1-8

Agency	Phone Number
Emergency Response Commission C/O Office of State Police	(877) 925-6595 (225) 925-6595 (24 hrs, Louisiana one-call emergency number)
Department of Environmental Quality Single Point of Contact	(225) 342-1234 (24 hrs) (225) 925-6595 (Emergency)
Oil Spill Response Coordinator, Louisiana 625 North Fourth St Ste 800 Baton Rouge, LA 70802	(225) 219-5800
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) P.O. Box 4312 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312	(225) 219-3953 (225) 342-1234 (24 Hour Hotline) (225) 219-3640 (SPOC)
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LDNR)	(225) 342-4500 (Business Hours) (225) 342-5505 (After Hours)
State or Federal Wildlife Management Pass à Loutre Wildlife Refuge Rockefeller Wildlife Refuge US Fish and Wildlife Service Delta Wildlife Refuge McFadden National Refuge Sabine National Refuge Breton Sound National Wildlife Refuge	(337) 373-0032 (New Iberia Office) (337) 538-2276 (800) 344-WILD (985) 882-2000 (409) 971-2909 (337) 762-3816 (985) 882-2000

State Of Louisiana Regulatory Notifications (Cont'd) Figure 1-8

In the circumstances shown below, call the State Police 24-hour Louisiana Emergency Hazardous Materials hotline. In addition, call the LEPC that has jurisdiction over the facility and the LEPCs for the affected parish. Calls should be made no later than one hour after becoming aware of the emergency.

- When an *emergency condition* exists which could reasonably be expected to endanger the public, cause significant environmental damage, or cause severe property damage. The hot line will in turn notify the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ).
- When one of the following occurs and the spill or release escapes to water, air, or ground outside the facility boundaries:
- *Ten gallons or more (100 lbs.)* of crude oil is spilled.
- *Twenty MCFD or more* of sweet natural gas are released.
- A release of sour gas occurs with a hydrogen sulfide (H2S) component of *more than 100 pounds.*
- A hazardous substance release meets or exceeds its *Reportable Quantity.*
- Facilities must make follow-up written reports within 5 days after the release occurs to the LEPC with jurisdiction over the facility, and to the:

Emergency Response Commission
c/o Department of Public Safety and Correction
Office of State Police
Transportation and Environmental Safety Section, Mail Slip 21
P. O. Box 66614
Baton Rouge, LA 70896

State Of Louisiana Regulatory Notifications (Cont'd) Figure 1-8

Notify the LDEQ under these conditions:
• When an *emergency condition* exists which could reasonably be expected to endanger the public, cause significant environmental damage, or cause severe property damage. A separate call is not needed; as stated above, the State Police hotline will notify the LDEQ. *Written follow-up to the DEQ is required within seven days. Written reports should be mailed to:*

LA Department of Environmental Quality
Attention Surveillance Division – SPOC
"Unauthorized Discharge Notification Report"
P. O. Box 4312
Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312

• When one of the following occurs *and* the spill or release is *not totally contained:*
• *More than one barrel* of crude oil is spilled.
• A release of sweet natural gas exceeds *1 MMCFD.*
• A release of sour gas occurs with an H2S component of *more than 100 pounds.*
• A hazardous substance release exceeds its *RQ.*

Call the LDNR immediately, but no later than two hours after discovery, for any of the following:
• A DOT *gas* pipeline release causes injury, death, fire, or damage of more than $50,000, including the value of lost product, and the cost of cleanup and recovery.
• A DOT *oil or condensate* pipeline spill exceeds 5 gallons or causes injury, death, fire, or damage of more than $50,000, including the value of lost product, and the cost of cleanup and recovery.
Verbal reports to the DNR should note that a DOT pipeline was involved.

If a spill impacts or has potential to impact a state or federal wildlife refuge, notify the appropriate refuge staff.

State Of Louisiana Regulatory Notifications (Cont'd) Figure 1-8

LA Parish Sheriff's Department	Phone Number
Cameron Parish (Cameron)	(337) 775-5111 (24 hrs)
Vermilion Parish (Abbeville)	(337) 893-0871 (24 hrs)
Iberia Parish (New Iberia)	(337) 369-3714 (24 hrs)
St. Mary Parish (Franklin)	(337) 828-1960 (24 hrs)
Terrebone Parish (Houma)	(985) 876-2500 (24 hrs)
LaFourche Parish (Thibodeaux)	(985) 449-2255 (24 hrs)
Jefferson Parish (Gretna)	(504) 363-5500 (24 hrs)
Plaquemines Parish (Pointe A La Hache)	(504) 564-2525 (24 hrs)
St. Bernard Parish (Chalmette)	(504) 271-2501 (24 hrs)
Orleans Parish (New Orleans)	(504) 822-8000 (24 hrs)

State Of Mississippi Regulatory Notifications — Figure 1-9

Agency	Phone Number
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) P.O. Box 4501 Jackson, MS 39296-4501	(601) 933-6362 (24 hrs) (800) 222-6362 (24 hrs)
Mississippi DEQ Bureau of Pollution Control (MDEQ) P.O. Box 10385 Jackson, MS 39289-0385 Oil and Hazardous Coordinator – Eric Deare	(601) 352-9100 (24 hrs) (800) 222-6362 (24 hrs)
Mississippi Department of Marine Resources (MDMR) 1141 Bayview Avenue, Suite 111 Biloxi, MS 39530 Lieutenant Frank Wescovich	(228) 374-5000 (228) 523-4134 (24 hrs) (Marine Patrol)
Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board (MS&GB) 500 Greymont Avenue, Suite E Jackson, MS 39202 Kent Ford	(601) 354-7142 (24 hrs)
When a sheen, slick, or spill is observed or discovered, or a non-permitted chemical release occurs, call the Mississippi state agencies listed in the table.	

Mississippi EMA & Sheriff's Offices	Phone Number
Hancock County EMA Sheriff's Office	 (228) 466-8320 (228) 466-6900
Harrison County EMA Sheriff's Office	 (228) 865-4002 (228) 896-3000
Jackson County EMA Sheriff's Office	 (228) 769-3111 (228) 769-3063
When five barrels or more of crude oil or condensate are spilled, call the appropriate Mississippi CCD agency or sheriff's office immediately.	

State Of Alabama Regulatory Notifications

Figure 1-10

Agency	Phone Number
AL Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) Mobile Field Office 2204 Perimeter Road Mobile, AL 36615 Chief of Mobile Branch (John Carlton)	(251) 450-3400 (24 hrs) (251) 242-4378 (24 hrs) (800) 424-8802 (State Warning Point)
AL Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) P.O. Box 301463 Montgomery, AL 36130-1463	(800) 843-0699 (24 hrs)
AL Oil and Gas Board (AO&GB) 4173 Commander Drive Mobile, AL 36615	(251) 438-4848 (251) 943-4326 (24 hrs)
AL Oil and Gas Board (AO&GB) Tuscaloosa, AL P.O. Box "O" Tuscaloosa, AL 35486-0004	(205) 349-2852
AL Civil Defense Mobile, AL	(251) 460-8000 (24 hrs)
AL Dept. of Conservation & Natural Resources (ADCNR) State Lands Division 64 North Union Street, Room 464 Montgomery, AL 36130 Nancy Cone	(334) 242-3467
When a sheen, slick, or spill is observed or discovered, or a non-permitted chemical release occurs, call the ADEM immediately. In addition, call the appropriate office of the AO&GB.	

State Of Florida Regulatory Notifications

Figure 1-11

Agency	Phone Number
State Warning Point (24-hour)	(800) 320-0519 or (850) 413-9911 (850) 413-9900 Emergency Response
Florida DEP District Emergency Response Offices (8am – 5pm)	
Tallahassee	(850) 245-2010
Pensacola	(850) 595-8300
Jacksonville	(904) 807-3300 x3246
Orlando	(407) 894-7555
Tampa	(813) 632-7600
Ft. Myers	(239) 332-6975
Ft. Lauderdale	(561) 681-6600
Florida Marine Patrol (24-hour)	(888) 404-3922

When a sheen, slick, or spill is observed or discovered, or a non-permitted chemical release occurs, call the State Warning Point, Florida Bureau of Emergency Response, and the Florida Marine Patrol.

The following information should be provided upon notification to Florida authorities:

1. Name, address, and telephone number of person reporting
2. Name, address, and telephone number of person responsible for the discharge or release, if known
3. Date and time of the discharge or release
4. Type or name of substance discharged or released
5. Estimated amount of the discharge or release
6. Location or address of discharge or release
7. Source and cause of the discharge or release
8. Size and characteristics of area affected by the discharge or release
9. Containment and cleanup actions taken to date
10. Other persons or agencies contacted

Alabama & Florida Local Notifications — Figure 1-11

Contact Information	Phone Number
Mobile, AL	
Sheriff's Department	(251) 574-2423
Police Department	(251) 208-7211
Fire Department	(251) 208-7351
Port Authority Security Department	(251) 441-7777 (24 hrs)
Emergency Management Agency	(251) 460-8000 (24 hrs)
Pensacola, FL	
Florida Highway Patrol	(850) 484-5000
Police Department	(850) 435-1900
Fire Department	(850) 436-5200

National Response Corporation Contact Information — Figure 1-12a

International Operations Center	
Toll Free Hotline – Spills Only	(800) 899-4672
Telephone	(631) 224-9141
Facsimile	(631) 224-9086
Telex	496 173 80
Email	iocdo@nrcc.com
Gulf of Mexico Operations Center	
Toll Free Hotline	(877) 334-4466
Telephone	(985) 380-3166
Facsimile	(985) 380-3163
Email	iocdo@nrcxchange.nrcc.com

Response Organization and Structure

BP's emergency response organization is designed to manage the response to any emergency involving BP's operations. The organizational structure of the IMT is based on NIMS ICS and operates within a tiered response framework, which allows for the mobilization of resources at varying levels as dictated by incident circumstances. **Figure 1-13** display a general and a detailed representation of the Incident Management Team Organizational structure within BP.
The Unified Command structure allows all agencies with responsibility for the incident, whether geographical or functional, to manage an incident by establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies. The Unified Command is responsible for the overall management of the incident and directs incident activities including the development and implementation of strategic decisions as well as approving the ordering and releasing of resources. **Figure 1-13** displays the Unified Command structure within the BP response organization. *For detailed information regarding the response organization and structure, please see* ***Section 4*** *of the OSRP.*

Multi-Tiered Response Organization – Tactical Response Team

BP's emergency response organization is designed to manage the response to any emergency involving BP's operations. It consists of three interfunctional tiers, each with its own response team, roles, and responsibilities. The first tier is the Tactical Response Team (TRT). The TRT is comprised of the highly trained personnel who initially respond to the incident and conduct the at-the-scene, hands-on tactical response operations. This team may include BP personnel (BP Strike Team), response contractors (OSROs), and government agency personnel (police and/or fire departments). Upon activation of an IMT, the TRT is integrated into and forms the bulk of the Operations Section of the IMT.

Multi-Tiered Response Organization – Incident Management Team

BP's Incident Management Teams are primarily comprised of BP personnel; however, the IMT may include BP Americas Response Team members, government agency personnel, and/or contractors. The primary roles of the IMT are:

- to provide strategic direction to incident response operations
- support the TRT
- address issues best handled at the IMT level
- interface with/provide information to external parties.

The organizational structure of the IMT is based on NIMS ICS and operates within a tiered response framework, which allows for the mobilization of resources at varying levels as dictated by incident circumstances. IMT duties and responsibilities are illustrated in **Figure 4-2.**

Refer to **Figure 4-1** for the BP IMT Organization Chart. The IMT Organization Chart is illustrated in **Figure 7-1** while the names and phone numbers for IMT members are listed in **Figure 7-6a.**

Multi-Tiered Response Organization – Business Support Team

The third tier of BP's emergency response organization is the Business Support Team (BST). The BST has two basic responsibilities – to provide support to the IMT and to address ancillary issues that are related to the incident but fall outside the IMT's responsibility to manage the immediate incident. Examples of BST responsibilities include:

•	Identify potential resources for use by the IMT
•	Liaise with local government representatives to mitigate potential ramifications of the incident on current or future legislation
•	Serve as communication conduit between the IMT and the Group Crisis Team
•	Assist in any matters or issues as requested by the IMT, e.g. media inquiries, HR, press releases
•	Provide assistance and support to the Group Crisis Team in the development of the strategic response to the incident
•	IP Worksheet assessment or further assessment of incident potential

The BST is small in comparison to a typical IMT, consisting of up to nine advisors who work in support of the BST Business Support Manager. It is important to note that the BST does not give response directions to the IMT. However, it is the responsibility of the BST Business Support Manager to confirm the qualifications of the Incident Commander for leading the IMT and, if appropriate, to designate a new Incident Commander to lead the IMT.

Incident Management Team Organizational Chart

Figure 1-13



G. Initial ICS Responsibilities

BP Incident Management Team Duties and Responsibilities Checklist	
INCIDENT COMMANDER (IC) (QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL) (QI)	
Responsible for overall command and control of emergency response effort	
✳	**Response Actions**
	Review common respons bilities.
	Review Incident Commander responsibilities and serve in such capacity until IMT is activated and in place.
	Serve as initial point of contact for RP personnel in initial response.
	Assess incident situation and ensure appropriate response steps are being taken.
	Ensure adequate safety measures are in place.
	Ensure regulatory notifications have been completed.
	Establish appropriate communications with FOSC, SOSC and other federal and state officials, as appropriate.
	Oversee initial response actions.
	Notify and activate Oil Spill Removal Organizations as is appropriate.
	Obligate funds, as is appropriate, to support the conduct of incident response activities.
	Ensure activation of Incident Management Team and The Response Group is completed.
	Request maps and trajectories from The Response Group.
	Perform additional responsibilities as designated by BP.
	Review general ICS procedures and common responsibilities.
	Obtain a briefing from the prior IC (201 Briefing), if applicable.
	Determine Incident Objectives & general direction for managing the incident.
	Establish the immediate priorities.
	Establish an ICP.
	Brief Command Staff and General Staff.
	Establish an appropriate organization.
	Ensure planning meetings are scheduled as required.
	Approve and authorize the implementation of an IAP.
	Ensure that adequate safety measures are in place.
	Coordinate activity for all Command and General Staff.
	Coordinate and serve as primary on-site contact with key people and officials.
	Approve requests for additional resources or for the release of resources.
	Keep agency administrator informed of incident status.
	Approve the use of trainees, volunteers, and auxiliary personnel.
	Serve as primary spokesperson and authorize release of information to the news media.
	Ensure ICS 209 is completed and forwarded to appropriate higher authority.
	Order the demobilization of the incident when appropriate.
	Supervise incident response operations and ensure that they are carried out in a manner consistent with BP's policy, appropriate government directives, and the needs and concerns of impacted areas.
	Analyze incident potential.
	Serve as primary on-site contact person for BP senior management, government representatives, and BP partners.
	Ensure that source control and response operations are carried out safely and closely coordinated.
	Monitor and evaluate effectiveness of source control and response operations.
	Approve and authorize implementation of General Plan.
	Consider need for an alternate or backup person for extended (24 hour) coverage.

BP Incident Management Team Duties and Responsibilities Checklist	
SAFETY OFFICER	
Responsible for the overall safety of emergency response operations	
✳	**Response Actions**
	Review general ICS procedures and common responsibilities.
	Participate in tactics and planning meetings, and other meetings and briefings as required.
	Identify hazardous situations associated with the incident.
	Review the IAP for safety implications.
	Provide safety advice in the IAP for assigned responders.
	Exercise emergency authority to stop and prevent unsafe acts.
	Investigate accidents that have occurred within the incident area.
	Assign assistants, as needed.
	Review and approve the medical plan (ICS Form 206).
	Develop the Site Safety Plan and publish a summary (ICS Form 208) as necessary.

BP Incident Management Team Duties and Responsibilities Checklist	
LIAISON OFFICER	
Responsible for assuming main point of contact role for regulatory agency involvement	
✳	**Response Actions**
	Review general ICS procedures and common responsibilities.
	Be a contact point for Agency Representatives.
	Maintain a list of assisting and cooperating agencies and Agency Representatives, including name and contact information. Monitor check-in sheets daily to ensure that all Agency Representatives are identified.
	Assist in establishing and coordinating interagency contacts.
	Keep agencies supporting the incident aware of incident status.
	Monitor incident operations to identify current or potential inter-organizational problems.
	Participate in planning meetings, providing current resource status, including limitations and capability of assisting agency resources.
	Coordinate response resource needs for Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration (NRDAR) activities with the OSC during oil and HAZMAT responses.
	Coordinate response resource needs for incident investigation activities with the OSC.
	Ensure that all required agency forms, reports and documents are completed prior to demobilization.
	Brief Command on agency issues and concerns.
	Have debriefing session with the IC prior to departure.
	Coordinate activities of visiting dignitaries.

BP Incident Management Team Duties and Responsibilities Checklist	
PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	
Responsible for developing and releasing information about the incident and managing personnel issues due to accidents/injuries	
✳	**Response Actions**
	Review general ICS procedures and common responsibilities.
	Determine from the IC if there are any limits on information release.
	Develop material for use in media briefings.
	Obtain IC approval of media releases.
	Inform media and conduct media briefings.
	Arrange for tours and other interviews or briefings that may be required.
	Manage a Joint Information Center (JIC) if established.
	Obtain media information that may be useful to incident planning.
	Maintain current information summaries and/or displays on the incident and provide information on the status of the incident to assigned personnel.

BP Incident Management Team Duties and Responsibilities Checklist	
LEGAL OFFICER	
The Legal Officer will act in an advisory capacity during an oil spill response	
✳	**Response Actions**
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Obtain briefing from the Incident Commander.
	Advise the Incident Commander (IC) and the Unified Command (UC), as appropriate, on all legal issues associated with response operations.
	Establish documentation guidelines for & provide advise regarding response activity documentation to the response team.
	Provide legal input to the Documentation Unit, the Compensation/Claims Unit, and other appropriate Units as requested.
	Review press releases, documentation, contracts & other matters that have legal implications for the Comp.
	Participate in Incident Command System (ICS) meetings and other meetings, as requested.
	Participate in incident investigations and the assessment of damages (including natural resource damage assessments).
	Maintain Individual/Activity Log (ICS Form 214a).

BP Incident Management Team Duties and Responsibilities Checklist	
HUMAN RESOURCES SPECIALIST	
The Human Resources specialist is responsible for providing direct human resources services to the response organization, including ensuring compliance with all labor-related laws and regulations	
✳	**Response Actions**
	Review general ICS procedures and common responsibilities.
	Provide a Point Of Contact (POC) for incident personnel to discuss human resource issues.
	Participate in daily briefings and planning meetings to provide appropriate human resource information.
	Post human resource information, as appropriate.
	Receive and address reports of inappropriate behavior, acts, or conditions through appropriate lines of authority.
	Maintain Unit Log (ICS 214).

BP Incident Management Team Duties and Responsibilities Checklist	
SOURCE CONTROL BRANCH	
Source Branch Group is responsible for coordinating and directing all salvage/source control activities related to the incident	
✳	**Response Actions**
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Review Division/Group Supervisor Responsibilities.
	Coordinate the development of Salvage/Source Control Plan.
	Determine Salvage/Source Control resource needs.
	Direct and coordinate implementation of the Salvage/Source Control Plan.
	Manage dedicated salvage/Source Control resources.
	Maintain Unit/Activity Log (ICS Form 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF

Responsible for management of all operations directly applicable to the response effort

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Obtain briefing from IC.
	Request sufficient Section supervisory staffing for both ops & planning activities.
	Convert operational incident objectives into strategic and tactical options through a work analysis matrix.
	Coordinate and consult with the PSC, SOFR technical specialists, modeling scenarios, trajectories, etc., on selection of appropriate strategies and tactics to accomplish objectives.
	Identify kind and number of resources required to support selected strategies.
	Subdivide work areas into manageable units.
	Develop work assignments and allocate tactical resources based on strategy requirements.
	Coordinate planned activities with the SOFR to ensure compliance with safety practices.
	Prepare ICS 234 Work Analysis Matrix with PSC to ensure Strategies & Tactics and tasks are in line with ICS 202 Response Objectives to develop ICS 215.
	Participate in the planning process and the development of the tactical portions (ICS 204 and ICS 220) of the IAP.
	Assist with development of long-range strategic, contingency, and demobilization plans.
	Supervise Operations Section personnel.
	Monitor need for and request additional resources to support operations as necessary.
	Coordinate with the LOFR and AREPs to ensure compliance with approved safety practices.
	Evaluate and monitor current situation for use in next operational period planning.
	Interact and coordinate with Command on achievements, issues, problems, significant changes special activities, events, and occurrences.
	Troubleshoot operational problems with other IMT members.
	Supervise and adjust operations organization and tactics as necessary.
	Participate in operational briefings to IMT members as well as briefings to media, and visiting dignitaries.
	Develop recommended list of Section resources to be demobilized and initiate recommendation for release when appropriate.
	Receive and implement applicable portions of the incident Demobilization Plan.
	Establish Command Network and communications protocol.
	Review and ensure the appropriateness of strategy and tactics being employed by On-scene Commander; provide necessary strategic direction.
	Provide Planning Section Chief or Situation Unit up-to-date information on nature and status of tactical response operations.
	Assist Planning Section Chief or Plan Development Unit preparing Incident Action Plan in Preparation of General Plan.
	Assist Planning Section Chief or Plan Development Unit preparing General Plan in preparation of General Plan.
	Ensure that Operations Section Personnel are aware of & follow BP safety polices, appropriate government agency directives, & Site Safety Plan.
	Ensure that concerns of government agencies & impacted citizens are adequately considered in formulation & execution of response strategies.
	Receive information from Planning Section Chief on location & movement of spilled or emitted materials.
	Work with Environmental Unit Leader Officers to develop an overall Shoreline Protection/Cleanup Strategy.
	Provide Information & Liaison Officers Updates on nature & status of tactical response operations.
	Ensure that appropriate documentation is compiled by On-scene Commander and forwarded to Planning Section Chief of Documentation Unit.

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

RECOVERY AND PROTECTION BRANCH DIRECTOR

The Recovery and Protection Branch Director is responsible for overseeing and implementing the protection, containment and cleanup activities established in the IAP

✳	Response Actions
	Review common responsibilities
	Receive briefing from OSC/DOSC.
	Identify Divisions, Groups, and resources assigned to the Branch.
	Obtain briefing from person you are relieving.
	Ensure that Division Supervisors (DIVS) have a copy of the IAP.
	Implement IAP for Branch.
	Develop with subordinates alternatives for Branch control operations.
	Review Division/Group Assignment Lists (ICS 204) for Divisions/Groups within the Branch. Modify lists based on effectiveness of current operations.
	Assign specific work tasks to DIVS.
	Supervise Branch operations.
	Resolve logistic problems reported by subordinates.
	Attend planning meetings at the request of the OSC/DOSC.
	Ensure through chain of command that Resources Unit is advised of changes in the status of resources assigned to the Branch.
	Report to OSC/DOSC when: the IAP is to be modified; additional resources are needed; surplus resources are available; or hazardous situations or significant events occur.
	Approve accident and medical reports (home agency forms) originating within the Branch.
	Consider demobilization well in advance.
	Debrief with OSC/DOSC and/or as directed at the end of each shift.

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

STAGING AREA MANAGER

Responsible for managing all aspects of Staging Area(s) including safety and security

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Proceed to Staging Area.
	Establish Staging Area layout.
	Obtain briefing from person you are relieving, if applicable.
	Determine any support needs for equipment, feeding, sanitation and security.
	Establish check-in function as appropriate.
	Ensure security of staged resources.
	Post areas for identification and traffic control.
	Request maintenance service for equipment at Staging Area as appropriate.
	Respond to request for resource assignments. (Note: This may be direct from the OSC/DOSC or via the Incident Communications Center.)
	Obtain and issue receipts for radio equipment and other supplies distributed and received at Staging Area.
	Determine required resource levels from the OSC/DOSC.
	Advise the OSC/DOSC when reserve levels reach minimums.
	Maintain and provide status to Resource Unit of all resources in Staging Area.
	Maintain Staging Area in orderly condition.
	Demobilize Staging Area in accordance with the Incident Demobilization Plan.
	Debrief with OSC/DOSC or as directed at the end of each shift.

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

DISPOSAL GROUP

The Disposal Group Supervisor is responsible for coordinating the on-site activities of personnel engaged in collecting, storing, transporting, and disposing of waste materials

✳	Response Actions
	Review Division/Group Supervisor Responsibilities.
	Implement the Disposal Portion of the IAP.
	Ensure compliance with all hazardous waste laws and regulations.
	Maintain accurate records of recovered material.
	Maintain Unit/Activity Log (ICS Form 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

WILDLIFE BRANCH DIRECTOR

Responsible for minimizing wildlife losses during spill response operations

✳	Response Actions
	Review Branch Director Responsibilities.
	Develop the Wildlife Branch portion of the IAP.
	Supervise Wildlife Branch operations.
	Determine resource needs.
	Review the suggested list of resources to be released and initiate recommendation for release of resources.
	Assemble and disassemble teams/task forces assigned to the Wildlife Branch.
	Report information about special activities, events, and occurrences to the OPS.
	Assist the Volunteer Coordinator in determining training needs of wildlife recovery volunteers.
	Maintain Unit/Activity Log (ICS Form 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

PLANNING SECTION CHIEF

Responsible for collection, evaluation of information about development of incident

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Collect, process, and display incident information.
	Assist OSC in the development of response strategies.
	Supervise preparation of the IAP.
	Facilitate planning meetings and briefings.
	Assign personnel already on-site to ICS organizational positions as appropriate.
	Establish information requirements and reporting schedules for Planning Section Units (e.g., Resources, Situation).
	Determine the need for any specialized resources in support of the incident.
	Establish special information collection activities as necessary (e.g., weather, environmental, toxics, etc.).
	Assemble information on alternative strategies.
	Provide periodic predictions on incident potential.
	Keep IMT apprised of any significant changes in incident status.
	Compile and display incident status information.
	Oversee preparation and implementation of the Incident Demobilization Plan.
	Incorporate plans (e.g., Traffic, Medical, Communications, and Site Safety) into the IAP.
	Develop other incident supporting plans (e.g., salvage, transition, security).
	Assist Operations with development of the ICS 234 Work Analysis Matrix.
	Maintain Unit Log (ICS 214).
	Advise Incident Commander on all environmental aspects of source control & response operations, & ensure compliance with environmental laws, regulations, &/or government directives.
	Facilitate collection & retention of appropriate documentation.
	Ensure technical specialists are checked in & assigned to appropriate Units within IMT/TRT
	Environmentally sensitive areas, wildlife affected by incident, &/or status of protection efforts.
	Assist Information & Liaison Officers in responding to requests for information from media, government agencies, & other external parties.

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

SITUATION UNIT LEADER

Responsible for collection and analysis of incident data to determine current status of unit activities (i.e., trajectory modeling, GIS information)

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Review Unit Leader Responsibilities.
	Begin collection and analysis of incident data as soon as possible.
	Prepare, post, or disseminate resource and situation status information as required, including special requests.
	Prepare periodic predictions or as requested by the PSC.
	Prepare the Incident Status Summary Form (ICS Form 209).
	Provide photographic services and maps if required.
	Conduct situation briefings at the Command and General Staff Meetings, Tactics Meeting, Planning Meeting and Operations Briefing.
	Conduct situation briefings at other meetings/ briefings as required.
	Develop and maintain master chart(s)/map(s) of the incident.
	Maintain chart/map of incident in the common area of the ICP for all responders to view.
	Maintain Unit Log (ICS 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

RESOURCE UNIT LEADER

Responsible for maintaining an accounting system indicating location and status of all resources

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Review Unit Leader Responsibilities.
	Establish the check-in function at incident locations.
	Prepare Organization Assignment List (ICS Form 203) and Organization Chart (ICS Form 207).
	Prepare appropriate parts of Division Assignment Lists (ICS Form 204).
	Maintain and post the current status and location of all resources.
	Maintain master roster of all resources checked in at the incident.
	Review Resource Unit Leader Job Aid.
	Maintain Unit/Activity Log (ICS Form 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

DOCUMENTATION UNIT LEADER

Responsible for providing incident documentation, reviewing records for accuracy and storing documentation files

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Review Unit Leader Responsibilities.
	Set up work area; begin organization of incident files.
	Establish duplication service; respond to requests.
	File all official forms and reports.
	Review records for accuracy and completeness; inform appropriate units of errors or omissions.
	Provide incident documentation as requested.
	Organize files for submitting final incident documentation package.
	Prepare ICS 231 Meeting Summary & ICS 233 Action Item Tracker.
	Maintain Unit/Activity Log (ICS Form 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS

Responsible for coordinating activities with appropriate consultants and contractors (i.e., NRDA reps, Scientific Support Coordinator, etc.)

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Provide technical expertise and advice to Command and General Staff as needed.
	Attend meetings and briefings to clarify and help to resolve technical issues.
	Provide expertise during the development of the IAP and other support plans.
	Work with the Safety Officer to mitigate unsafe practices.
	Work closely with Liaison Officer to help facilitate understanding among stakeholders and special interest groups.
	Be available to attend press briefings to clarify technical issues.
	Work with Operations Section to monitor compliance with planned actions.
	Research technical issues and provide findings to decision makers.
	Provide appropriate modeling and predictions as needed.
	Trouble shoot technical problems and provide advice on resolution.
	Review specialized plans and clarify meaning.
	Review THSP Job Aid.
	Maintain Unit Log (ICS 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

LOGISTICS SECTION CHIEF

Responsible for managing all incident logistics

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Plan the organization of the Logistics Section.
	Assign work locations and preliminary work tasks to Section personnel.
	Notify the Resources Unit of the Logistics Section units activated including names and locations of assigned personnel.
	Assemble and brief Branch Directors and Unit Leaders.
	Determine and supply immediate incident resource and facility needs.
	In conjunction with Command, develop and advise all Sections of the IMT resource approval and requesting process.
	Review proposed tactics for upcoming operational period for ability to provide resources and logistical support.
	Identify long-term service and support requirements for planned and expected operations.
	Advise Command and other Section Chiefs on resource availability to support incident needs.
	Provide input to and review the Communications Plan, Medical Plan and Traffic Plan.
	Identify resource needs for incident contingencies.
	Coordinate and process requests for additional resources.
	Track resource effectiveness and make necessary adjustments.
	Advise on current service and support capabilities.
	Develop recommended list of Section resources to be demobilized and initiate recommendation for release when appropriate.
	Receive and implement applicable portions of the incident Demobilization Plan.
	Ensure the general welfare and safety of Logistics Section personnel.
	Maintain Unit Log (ICS 214).
	Work with Finance Section Chief to institute requisition procedure and provide the Finance Section Chief with copies of all Purchase Orders.
	Ensure that an overall inventory and inventory management system is maintained of all equipment system is maintained of all equipment, materials, and supplies purchased, rented, borrowed, or otherwise obtained during incident response operations.
	Ensure that records are maintained on equipment and services provided and contracts executed during incident response operations.
	Provide Planning Section Chief or Resource Unit with up-to-date information on destination and ETA of all equipment and personnel resources obtained for incident response operations.
	Assist Planning Section Chief or Plan Development Units in preparation of Incident Action Plans and General Plan.
	Provide Operations Section Chief with recommendations on timing of release of logistics services and support personnel and equipment.

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist
SERVICE BRANCH DIRECTOR

The Service Branch Director, when activated, is under the supervision of the LSC, and is responsible for the management of all service activities at the incident

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Obtain working materials.
	Determine the level of service required to support operations.
	Confirm dispatch of branch personnel.
	Participate in planning meetings of Logistics Section personnel.
	Review the IAP.
	Organize and prepare assignments for Service Branch personnel.
	Coordinate activities of Branch Units.
	Inform the LSC of branch activities.
	Resolve Service Branch problems.
	Maintain Unit/Activity Log (ICS Form 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist
SUPPORT BRANCH DIRECTOR

Responsible for development of logistic plans in support of IAP for supply, facilities and transportation

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Obtain work materials.
	Identify Support Branch personnel dispatched to the incident.
	Determine initial support operations in coordination with the LSC and Service Branch Director.
	Prepare initial organization and assignments for support operations.
	Assemble and brief Support Branch personnel.
	Determine if assigned branch resources are sufficient.
	Maintain surveillance of assigned units work progress and inform the LSC of their activities.
	Resolve problems associated with requests from the Operations Section.
	Maintain Unit/Activity Log (ICS Form 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT LEADER

Responsible for distribution, installation, maintenance, technical advice and overall Communication Plan for incident response operation

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Review Unit Leader Responsibilities.
	Determine Unit personnel needs.
	Prepare and implement the Incident Radio Communications Plan (ICS Form 205).
	Ensure the Incident Communications Center and the Message Center is established.
	Establish appropriate communications distribution/maintenance locations within the Base.
	Ensure communications systems are installed and tested.
	Ensure an equipment accountability system is established.
	Ensure personal portable radio equipment from cache is distributed per Incident Radio Communications Plan.
	Provide technical information as required on: - Adequacy of communications systems currently in operation. - Geographic limitation on communications systems. - Equipment capabilities/limitations. - Amount and types of equipment available. - Anticipated problems in the use of communications equipment.
	Supervise Communications Unit activities.
	Maintain records on all communications equipment as appropriate.
	Ensure equipment is tested and repaired.
	Recover equipment from units being demobilized.
	Maintain Unit/Activity Log (ICS Form 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

FINANCE SECTION CHIEF

Responsible for managing and supervising financial aspects of emergency response operations

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Participate in incident planning meetings and briefings as required.
	Review operational plans and provide alternatives where financially appropriate.
	Manage all financial aspects of an incident.
	Provide financial and cost analysis information as requested.
	Gather pertinent information from briefings with responsible agencies.
	Develop an operating plan for the Finance/Admin Section; fill supply and support needs.
	Determine the need to set up and operate an incident commissary.
	Meet with Assisting and Cooperating Agency Representatives, as needed.
	Maintain daily contact with agency(s) administrative headquarters on Finance/Admin matters.
	Ensure that all personnel time records are accurately completed and transmitted to home agencies, according to policy.
	Provide financial input to demobilization planning.
	Ensure that all obligation documents initiated at the incident are properly prepared and completed.
	Brief agency administrative personnel on all incident-related financial issues needing attention or follow-up prior to leaving incident.
	Develop recommended list of Section resources to be demobilized and initial recommendation for release when appropriate.
	Receive and implement applicable portions of the incident Demobilization Plan.
	Maintain Unit Log (ICS 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

PROCUREMENT UNIT LEADER

Responsible for managing all financial matters pertaining to vendors, contracts, leases and fiscal agreements

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Review Unit Leader Responsibilities.
	Review incident needs and any special procedures with Unit Leaders, as needed.
	Coordinate with local jurisdiction on plans and supply sources.
	Obtain the Incident Procurement Plan.
	Prepare and authorize contracts and land-use agreements.
	Draft memoranda of understanding as necessary.
	Establish contracts and agreements with supply vendors.
	Provide for coordination between the Ordering Manager and all other procurement organizations supporting the incident.
	Ensure that a system is in place that meets agency property management requirements. Ensure proper accounting for all new property.
	Interpret contracts and agreements; resolve disputes within delegated authority.
	Coordinate with the Compensation/Claims Unit for processing claims.
	Complete final processing of contracts and send documents for payment.
	Coordinate cost data in contracts with the Cost Unit Leader.
	Brief the Finance Section Chief on current problems and recommendations, outstanding issues, and follow-up requirements.
	Maintain Unit/Activity Log (ICS Form 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

COMPENSATION / CLAIMS UNIT LEADER

The Compensation/Claims Unit Leader is responsible for the overall management and direction of all administrative matters pertaining to compensation for injury and claims related activities (other than injury) for an incident

✳	Response Actions
	Review Common Responsibilities.
	Review Unit Leader Responsibilities.
	Obtain a briefing from the Finance Section Chief.
	Establish contact with the incident MEDL, SOFR and NLO (or Agency Representatives if no NLO is assigned).
	Determine the need for Compensation for Injury and Claims Specialists and order personnel as needed.
	Establish a Compensation for Injury work area within or as close as possible to the Medical Unit.
	Review Incident Medical Plan. (ICS Form 206).
	Ensure that Compensation/Claims Specialists have adequate workspace and supplies.
	Review and coordinate procedures for handling claims with the Procurement Unit.
	Brief the Compensation/Claims Specialists on incident activity.
	Periodically review logs and forms produced by the Compensation/Claims Specialists to ensure that they are complete, entries are timely and accurate and that they are in compliance with agency requirements and policies.
	Ensure that all Compensation for Injury and Claims logs and forms are complete and routed to the appropriate agency for post-incident processing prior to demobilization.
	Keep the Finance Section Chief briefed on Unit status and activity.
	Demobilize unit in accordance with the Incident Demobilization Plan.
	Maintain Unit/Activity Log (ICS Form 214).

BP Incident Management Team
Duties and Responsibilities Checklist

COST UNIT LEADER

Responsible for providing incident cost analysis

✳	Response Actions
	Review Unit Leader Responsibilities.
	Obtain a briefing from the Finance Section Chief.
	Coordinate with agency headquarters on cost reporting procedures.
	Collect and record all cost data.
	Develop incident cost summaries.
	Prepare resources-use cost estimates for the Planning Section.
	Make cost-saving recommendations to the Finance Section Chief.
	Ensure all cost documents are accurately prepared.
	Maintain cumulative incident cost records.
	Complete all records prior to demobilization.
	Provide reports to the Finance Section Chief.
	Maintain Unit/Activity Log (ICS Form 214).

Dispersant Approval Process

Dispersants are chemicals used to remove floating oil from the water surface and disperse it into the water column in order to reduce impact to sensitive shoreline habitats and animals that are present on the water surface. Specially formulated products containing surface-active agents are sprayed onto the slicks by aircraft or boat and are applied undiluted or mixed with water. The dispersants reduce the oil/water surface tension and decrease the energy needed for the slick to break into small particles and mix into the water column. Some turbulence is needed to mix the dispersant into the oil and the treated oil into the water.

Figure 1-14 represents a Dispersant Use Decision Tree to aid in determining whether or not to pursue dispersants as a response option. **Figure 1-15** is the Dispersant Application form for Pre-Approval by the Regional Response

Dispersant Use Decision Tree

Figure 1-14